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ABSTRACT 
This Article responds to recent proposals calling for the SEC to adopt a 
mandatory ESG-disclosure framework. It illustrates how the breadth and 
vagueness of these proposals obscures the important—and controversial—
policy questions that would need to be addressed before the SEC could move 
forward on the proposals in a principled way. The questions raised include 
some of the most contested in the field of corporate and securities law, such 
as the value of interjurisdictional competition for corporate charters, the 
right way to conceptualize the purpose of the corporation, the proper 
allocation of managerial power as between the board and shareholders, 
and the social desirability of fraud-on-the-market class actions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The acronym “ESG” is used as shorthand for a dizzyingly broad array of 
“environmental,” “social,” and “governance” topics affecting businesses. 
The topics spanned include climate change, human capital management, 
supply chain management, human rights, cybersecurity, diversity and 
inclusion, corporate tax policy, corporate political spending, executive 
compensation practices, and more.1 Members of the ESG movement are 
similarly diverse, in both identity and motivation. They include financially 
motivated investors and traditional asset managers who believe companies’ 
approach to (at least certain) ESG topics will bear on the companies’ long-
term performance, or the long-term performance of the investors’ or asset 
managers’ broader investment portfolios.2 They also include values-based 
investors who care about whether, and how, corporations address (at least 
 
1. See, e.g., Stavros Gadinis & Amelia Miazad, Corporate Law & Social Risk, 73 VAND. L. 
REV. 1401, 1414–15 (2020) (listing within “ESG’s wide scope” issues related to privacy, climate change, 
diversity, workplace relationships, including gender equality and diversity, technology problems like 
privacy and cybersecurity, and supply chain challenges like humane work conditions, and observing that 
“ESG’s scope expands by the day with new concerns vying for corporate attention, like the use of sugar 
in packaged foods or children and screen time”); INV. CO. INST., INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: 
A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 50 (2020), https://ww 
w.ici.org/pdf/2020_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/HLZ5-ZN8Q] (observing that ESG “matters vary 
widely, but are generally considered to include topics related to climate change, diversity and inclusion, 
human rights, the rights of company shareholders, and companies’ compensation structures”). 
Sometimes the equally broad terms “sustainability” and “non-financial disclosure” are used 
synonymously to refer to this collection of topics. 
2. See, e.g., Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2020 Letter to CEOs: A Fundamental Reshaping of 
Finance, BLACKROCK (2020) https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2020-larry-fink-
ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/S6JM-YKQW] (stating that BlackRock’s “investment conviction is that 
sustainability- and climate-integrated portfolios can provide better risk-adjusted returns to investors”); 
John C. Coffee, The Future of Disclosure: ESG, Common Ownership, and Systematic Risk (Eur. Corp. 
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 541, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
3678197 [https://perma.cc/TD8Q-PWDP] (linking interest in ESG disclosure by managers of diversified 
index funds to a desire to reduce systematic risk); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Stewardship (Columbia 
Law and Economics Working Paper No. 640, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_i 
d=3782814 (arguing that index funds’ approach to ESG matters can serve the interests of their investors 













certain) ESG topics due to religious or sociopolitical commitments.3 The 
ESG umbrella also shelters various non-investor corporate stakeholders and 
third parties who care about whether, and how, corporations address (at least 
certain) ESG topics because they are personally affected (e.g., employees 
vis-à-vis labor practices) or due to religious or sociopolitical commitments 
(e.g., environmentalists vis-à-vis environmental impact).4 ESG proponents 
also include members of an emerging corps of people and institutions who 
profit from the movement, including corporate sustainability officers, 5 
providers of ESG ratings and indices,6 accounting firms that offer ESG-
related services,7 and managers of specialized ESG-investment vehicles.8  
 
3. Of the 511 funds that the Investment Company Institute categorizes as investing according 
to ESG criteria in its 2020 Fact Book (“ESG funds”), 141 (28%) fall within the “religious values focus” 
subcategory. See INV. CO. INST., supra note 1, at 52. This subcategory represents $104.6 billion (33%) 
of the $321.3 billion in total net assets managed by ESG funds identified by the Investment Company 
Institute as of December 2019. Id.  
4. The ESG movement in this regard is also contributing to the recently reinvigorated debate 
over corporate purpose. For an attempt to bring greater clarity to that debate, see Edward Rock, For 
Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020: The Debate over Corporate Purpose (Eur. Corp. 
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 515, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
3589951 [https://perma.cc/F5ZF-7Q3U]. 
5. See Kathleen Miller Perkins & George Serafeim, Chief Sustainability Officers: Who Are They 
and What Do They Do?, in LEADING SUSTAINABLE CHANGE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 196, 
196–97 (Rebecca Henderson, Ranjay Gulati & Michael Tushman eds., 2015) (noting that “[o]ne recent 
trend has been the increasing appointment of Chief Sustainability Officers (CSOs) to drive the 
formulation and execution of an organization’s sustainability strategy” and that the “number of CSOs 
has grown substantially over the past few years”). 
6. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and Social 
Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 381, 387 (2020) 
(observing that “[h]undreds of commercial ESG indices provide ESG ratings of individual companies”); 
Dana Brakman Reiser & Anne Tucker, Buyer Beware: Variation and Opacity in ESG and ESG Index 
Funds, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1921, 1992 (2020) (observing that “[r]ising interest in ESG investing has 
[] generated a huge market opportunity for the providers of ESG indices and metrics, who are [] 
capitalizing on this key moment”). 
7. For examples of ESG-related service offerings by the “Big Four” accounting firms, see ESG 
Reporting: It’s Vital to How You Tell Your Company’s Story, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, https://www 
.pwc.com/us/en/services/audit-assurance/esg-reporting.html [https://perma.cc/CHV4-QEPX]; ESG 
Investor Relations Services, KPMG, https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/services/advisory/risk-consulting/i 
nternal-audit-risk/sustainability-services/esg-investor-relations-services.html [https://perma.cc/Q8YG-
EA25]; Climate Change and Sustainability Services, ERNST & YOUNG, https://www.ey.com/en_gl/clim 
ate-change-sustainability-services [https://perma.cc/6AZ5-D3QS]; Climate & Sustainability: Guiding 
Organizations to a More Sustainable Future, DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/covid-19/ 
climate---sustainability.html/?icid=wn_climate---sustainability [https://perma.cc/ENR6-MF5V]. 
8. According to Morningstar, the ESG/sustainable funds universe grew to 303 open-end and 
exchange-traded funds in 2019, consisting of three broad types: “ESG Focus,” “Impact/Thematic,” and 
“Sustainable Sector.” See MORNINGSTAR, SUSTAINABLE FUNDS U.S. LANDSCAPE REPORT 2 (2020). At 
the same time, the number of conventional funds that now say they “consider” ESG factors has grown 
to 564 funds from 81 in 2018. See id. The 564 “ESG Consideration” funds had $933 billion in assets 
under management at the end of 2019. See id. at 6. Using a different classification methodology, the 
Investment Company Institute reports that, as of December 2019, there were 511 funds that invest 
according to ESG criteria with a total of $321.3 billion in assets under management. See INV. CO. INST., 
supra note 1, at 52. 












Even the Business Roundtable, an association of chief executive officers 
of leading U.S. corporations, seemingly embraced ESG in its 2019 
Statement on the Purpose of the Corporation,9  though some suspect its 
motivations have more to do with public relations or a desire to protect 
executives from shareholder discipline than a true commitment to ESG.10 
The stated motivations of others involved in the movement can also be 
questioned. Traditional asset managers claim their commitment to ESG is 
motivated by a desire to improve long-term fund performance for the benefit 
of investors.11 But agency costs offer an alternative potential explanation: 
embracing the ESG movement may help asset managers curry political 
favor, enabling them to fend off greater regulation of the industry;12 it may 
 
9. Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019), https://syste 
m.businessroundtable.org/app/uploads/sites/5/2021/02/BRT-Statement-on-the-Purpose-of-a-Corporati 
on-Feburary-2021-compressed.pdf [https://perma.cc/XUT6-HRYL]. 
10. See, e.g., Council of Institutional Investors Responds to Business Roundtable Statement on 
Corporate Purpose, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVS. (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.cii.org/aug19_brt_ 
response [https://perma.cc/48X9-PFZ8] (warning that “‘stakeholder governance’ and ‘sustainability’” 
may become “hiding places for poor management”); Editorial, The ‘Stakeholder’ CEOs, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 19, 2019, 5:09 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-stakeholder-ceos-11566248641 (observing 
that there is “more than a whiff of pre-emptive politics” in the Business Roundtable’s statement and 
warning that “[a]n ill-defined stakeholder model can quickly become a license for CEOs to waste capital 
on projects that might make them local or political heroes but ill-serve those same stakeholders if the 
business falters”); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder 
Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 98 (2020) (arguing that the statement is “largely . . . a rhetorical 
public relations move, rather than the harbinger of meaningful change”); see also Elizabeth Demers, 
Jurian Hendrikse, Philip Joos & Baruch Lev, ESG Didn’t Immunize Stocks Against the COVID-19 
Market Crash, but Investments in Intangible Assets Did, J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. (forthcoming 2021) 
(manuscript at 7), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3675920 [https://perma.cc/996E-XR5A] (noting that an 
“alternative view on corporate ESG investments derives from agency theory,” and explaining that this 
“more skeptical perspective suggests that executives may choose to improve their compan[ies’] ESG 
scores at the expense of shareholders in order to build their own personal reputations”). 
11. See, e.g., Fink, supra note 2; Ron O’Hanley, Investor Focus on Sustainability Is About 
Managing Risk, STATE ST. (Feb. 2020), https://www.statestreet.com/ideas/articles/investor-focus-on-su 
stainability-is-about-managing-risk.html [https://perma.cc/M89R-J2HG] (“Sustainable investing is 
about value, not values . . . .”). 
12. The embrace of ESG by large asset managers has occurred during a time of increasing public 
concern regarding the outsized power these managers have over the economy. See, e.g., David 
McLaughlin & Annie Massa, The Hidden Dangers of the Great Index Fund Takeover, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 9, 2020, 12:40 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-01-09/the-
hidden-dangers-of-the-great-index-fund-takeover (observing that the biggest three asset managers, 
BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, are “potentially the most powerful force over a huge swath of 
America Inc.” and that “[a]larm bells have begun to go off with some regulators, as well as with an 
ideologically diverse array of academics and activists”); Matt Egan, BlackRock and the $15 Trillion 
Fund Industry Should Be Broken Up, Antimonopoly Group Says, CNN BUS. (Nov. 24, 2020, 1:25 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/24/business/blackrock-vanguard-state-street-biden/index.html [https://p 
erma.cc/MKY8-75JM] (reporting that “[c]ritics say BlackRock (BLK), Vanguard and State Street (STT) 
have become too powerful and that the Biden administration and Congress need to rein them in”); John 
C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve 19–23 (Harv. L. Sch., 














advance the personal sociopolitical commitments of those who run them;13 
or it may offer a way to attract investors to fund offerings without imposing 
any meaningful limitations on how a fund is managed.14 
The breadth of topics embraced by ESG, and the breadth of motivations 
spurring the ESG movement, has created a big tent that has undoubtedly 
served a purpose in terms of helping the various causes of those involved to 
gain momentum. But it has also created problems. For example, ESG 
performance ratings are inconsistent and difficult to decipher. Which of the 
myriad ESG issues are factored into a rating, how performance on those 
issues is measured, and the weight each issue is given are subjective, usually 
non-transparent determinations that vary across ratings providers. 15  The 
breadth of ESG topics also makes studies that purport to show a positive 
link between ESG performance and financial performance difficult to 
interpret. There is no a priori reason to believe that a company’s approach 
to climate change and a company’s approach to diversity or any other ESG 
issue will have the same sort of impact on a company’s financial 
performance; yet these studies often bundle ESG issues together to measure 
ESG performance or rely on ESG performance ratings that themselves 
bundle the issues together. They therefore leave unanswered which, if any, 
 
/perma.cc/6EBR-WEPZ] (outlining various potential policy responses to the “legitimacy and 
accountability challenge” posed by the concentration of power “in the hands of a dozen or fewer people” 
at the largest asset managers). 
13. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Uncertain Stewardship Potential of Index Funds 117–18, in 
GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER STEWARDSHIP: COMPLEXITIES, CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES (Dionysia 
Katelouzou & Dan W. Puchniak eds., Cambridge University Press, forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.co 
m/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3525355 (observing that the heads of institutional intermediaries may 
use their position to advance their personal policy preferences). 
14. See Reiser & Tucker, supra note 6, at 1992 (discussing the “[d]iverse supply side forces” that 
“drive ESG asset growth and contribute to ESG market heterogeneity and opacity”); see also Michal 
Barzuza, Quinn Curtis & David H. Weber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the 
New Millennial Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243 (2020) (arguing that index fund 
managers’ interest in ESG is motivated by a desire to court investment by socially-conscious millennials 
rather than a concern for shareholder value); see also Paul G. Mahoney & Julia D. Mahoney, The New 
Separation of Ownership and Control: Institutional Investors and ESG, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript 15–18), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3809914 
(describing the agency costs in both public and private funds that may cause them to embrace ESG). 
15. See, e.g., Rajna Gibson, Philipp Krueger & Peter Steffen Schmidt, ESG Rating Disagreement 
and Stock Returns 5–8 (Swiss Fin. Inst., Working Paper No. 19-67, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/p 
apers.cfm?abstract_id=3433728 [https://perma.cc/YG4W-Y4WQ] (explaining that, “[g]iven the 
complexity of measuring a firm’s non-financial or ESG performance, the validity of these ratings has 
been debated critically” and providing an overview of the literature on ESG ratings divergence); see also 
James Mackintosh, Is Tesla or Exxon More Sustainable? It Depends Whom You Ask, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 
17, 2018, 11:58 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-tesla-or-exxon-more-sustainable-it-depends-who 
m-you-ask-1537199931 (explaining how the same company’s ESG score can vary widely depending on 
the methodology employed by the ESG rating provider and observing that ESG ratings “are no more 
than a series of judgments by the scoring companies about what matters – and investors who blindly 
follow their scores are buying into those opinions, mostly without even knowing what they are”). 












discrete corporate policies related to ESG actually impact financial 
performance.16  
Regulators have also pointed out problems with use of the term “ESG.” 
SEC officials have expressed concerns regarding its use in mutual fund 
advertising, because its vagueness can leave fund investors with 
misimpressions regarding what exactly they are buying into.17 Rule changes 
may follow. 18  The Department of Labor (DOL) cited a lack of clarity 
regarding the goals of ESG investment funds as a basis for a recent rule 
 
16. See Magali A. Delmas, Dror Etzion & Nicholas Nairn-Birch, Triangulating Environmental 
Performance: What Do Corporate Social Responsibility Ratings Really Capture?, 27 ACAD. MGMT. 
PERSPS. 255, 256 (2013) (observing that “while there appears to be agreement that environmental and 
social performance is multidimensional and that the strength of the relationship between each dimension 
and financial performance may vary, there is little consensus in the literature on what each dimension 
represents and thus what corporate social responsibility ratings actually measure”); Jon Entine, The Myth 
of Social Investing: A Critique of Its Practice and Consequences for Corporate Social Rerformance 
Research, 16 ORG. & ENV’T 352, 354–56 (2003) (critiquing a popular rating used by academic 
researchers of corporate social performance (CSP) as “hopelessly flawed” and observing that 
“[a]lthough there is general agreement that CSP is a multidimensional construct, there are no agreed-on 
standards or theoretical rationale or way to aggregate and therefore compare multiple dimensions across 
or within industries”); see also Virginia Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure and the Costs of 
Private Ordering, 55 AM. BUS. L. J. 407, 419 (2018) (reviewing the empirical literature supporting the 
materiality of ESG information and noting that the literature “shows that the financial materiality of 
many specific ESG indicators varies by industry sector” and that “large-scale studies do not answer the 
question of which ESG indicators are material to a particular firm’s investors”) (emphasis added). Some 
posit that corporations that embrace ESG activities can build social capital and trust, positioning the firm 
to better weather periods of crises, see, e.g., Paul C. Godfrey, Craig B. Merrill & Jared M. Hansen, The 
Relationship Between Corporate Social Responsibility and Shareholder Value: An Empirical Test of the 
Risk Management Hypothesis, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 425 (2009), or that the engagement with 
stakeholders that ESG activities promote may help surface risks leading to better risk management 
practices, see, e.g., Gadinis & Miazad, supra note 1. These claims are empirically contested, see, e.g., 
Demers, et al., supra note 10, and like more general assertions that ESG contributes to better firm 
financial performance, they leave unanswered just which of the myriad activities that fall under the ESG 
heading lead to the hypothesized effects. 
17. See Elad L. Roisman, Comm’r, SEC, Keynote Speech at the Society for Corporate 
Governance National Conference (July 7, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/roisman-keynote-
society-corporate-governance-national-conference-2020 [https://perma.cc/A5YV-8ZL5]; Juliet Chung 
& Dave Michaels, ESG Funds Draw SEC Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 16, 2019, 7:05 AM), https://www. 
wsj.com/articles/esg-funds-draw-sec-scrutiny-11576492201; Pippa Stevens, ‘Fooling Ourselves’ to 
Focus on ‘Amorphous’ Social Investing Factors, Says SEC Commissioner Peirce, CNBC (Dec. 17, 
2019, 3:49 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/17/sec-commissioner-hester-peirce-calls-for-oversight 
-of-esg-funds.html [https://perma.cc/3XEQ-2T7W]. Recent empirical work by Professors Dana 
Brakman Reiser & Anne Tucker substantiates these concerns. See Brakman Reiser & Tucker, supra note 
6, at 1927 (concluding that “the ESG label acts more as a product signal and branding mechanism than 
it does a promise of a specific investment strategy or avoided externalities”). See also SEC, Division of 
Examinations, Risk Alert: The Division of Examinations Review of ESG Investing (April 9, 2021), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/esg-risk-alert.pdf (highlighting deficiencies and internal control weaknesses 
identified during examinations of advisers and funds related to ESG investing). 
18. See, e.g., Request for Comments on Fund Names, 85 Fed. Reg. 13221, 13222–25 (March 6, 
2020); see also Andrew Ramonas, Asset Managers Need More ESG Vote Transparency, SEC’s Lee 
Says, BLOOMBERG LAW (March 17, 2021) (reporting on then-acting SEC Chair Allison Lee’s comment 














proposal that would have clarified that ERISA plan fiduciaries cannot offer 
or invest in a fund if the fund’s strategy allows it to prioritize non-economic 
ESG benefits or risks at the expense of financial returns.19 The proposed 
rule was severely criticized by ESG proponents, who contended that it 
would discourage ESG investing.20  The final rule, issued late last year, 
continues to require that ERISA plan fiduciaries focus only on pecuniary 
factors when making investment decisions, but removed any specific 
references to “ESG.”21 In the preamble to the final rule, the DOL explained 
that “‘ESG’ terminology, although used in common parlance when 
discussing investments and investment strategies, is not a clear or helpful 
lexicon for a regulatory standard.”22 The DOL found fault with the term in 
part because “by conflating unrelated environmental, social, and corporate 
governance factors into a single term, ESG invites a less than appropriately 
rigorous analytical approach in evaluating whether any given E, S, or G 
consideration presents a material business risk or opportunity to a company 
that corporate officers and directors should manage as part of the company’s 
business plan and that qualified investment professionals would treat as 
economic considerations in evaluating an investment in that company.”23 
In this Article I address one manifestation of what we might call the 
“ESG fuzziness problem.” The SEC has recently come under pressure to 
mandate ESG disclosures by public companies in their SEC filings, and a 
recent House bill would require it to do so.24 Although a large percentage of 
public companies voluntarily disclose ESG-related information in stand-
alone sustainability reports,25 they utilize divergent frameworks developed 
by private standard-setters, and the disclosures may not be produced in the 
same careful manner as disclosures in SEC filings. Proponents of an SEC-
mandated ESG disclosure regime argue it would enhance investors’ ability 
 
19. See Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 39113, 39114 (proposed 
June 30, 2020). The proposed rule also highlighted the documentation requirements an ERISA plan 
fiduciary must comply with if they choose an ESG investment under the “all things being equal” test, 
which allows ERISA fiduciaries to select an investment on non-pecuniary grounds if it is economically 
indistinguishable from alternatives. For discussions of how ERISA affects ESG investing by fund 
trustees, see Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 6, at 404–11, and Coffee, supra note 2, at 22–34. 
20. See, e.g., John Sullivan, Dem Senators Oppose DOL’s ESG Investing Rule, 401K SPECIALIST 
MAG. (July 16, 2020), https://401kspecialistmag.com/dem-senators-oppose-dols-esg-investing-rule/ [htt 
ps://perma.cc/K79W-ZM4V]. 
21. See Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,846 (Nov. 13. 2020) 
(codified at 28 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (2020)). 
22. Id. at 72,857. 
23. Id. 
24. See infra Part I. 
25. See generally KPMG, THE TIME HAS COME: THE KPMG SURVEY OF SUSTAINABILITY 
REPORTING 2020 (2020), https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2020/11/the-time-has-come.pd 
f [https://perma.cc/JH69-4747]. 












to compare companies on ESG dimensions, combat the problem of selective 
ESG disclosure (also known as “greenwashing”), and improve the quality 
of ESG disclosures.26 I offer no opinion as to whether the SEC ought to 
mandate disclosure of information related to any particular ESG topic, or 
whether it should—as recent proposals advocate—adopt a mandatory ESG 
disclosure framework. My purpose, rather, is to illustrate how the breadth 
and vagueness of the recent proposals obscure the important—and 
controversial—policy questions that would need to be addressed before the 
SEC could move forward on the proposals in a principled way. The 
questions raised include some of the most contested in the field of corporate 
and securities law, such as the value of interjurisdictional competition for 
corporate charters, the right way to conceptualize the purpose of the 
corporation, the proper allocation of managerial power as between the board 
and shareholders, and the social desirability of fraud-on-the-market class 
actions. 
I. RECENT CALLS FOR SEC-MANDATED ESG DISCLOSURE  
On April 15, 2016, the SEC issued a concept release seeking input on 
whether the disclosure requirements in Regulation S-K elicit the 
information that investors need for investment and voting decisions, how 
registrants can most effectively present the information, and the costs and 
benefits of disclosure requirements for companies and investors.27 Some of 
the questions that the SEC sought feedback on concerned “the importance 
of sustainability and public policy matters to informed investment and 
voting decisions.” 28  The release explained that the Commission “has 
determined in the past that disclosure relating to environmental and other 
matters of social concern should not be required of all registrants unless 
appropriate to further a specific congressional mandate or unless, under the 
particular facts and circumstances, such matters are material.”29  It thus 
asked that commentators provide “feedback on which, if any, sustainability 
and public policy disclosures are important to an understanding of a 
registrant’s business and financial condition and whether there are other 
 
26. See infra Part I. 
27. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Solicits Public Comment on Business and Financial Disclosure 
Requirements in Regulation S-K (April 15, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-70.html 
[https://perma.cc/AAA7-WGTD]. This was part of a broader initiative by the SEC’s Division of 
Corporation Finance to review the disclosure requirements applicable to public companies. 
28. Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,970 
(Apr. 22, 2016). 
29. Id. (referencing Environmental and Social Disclosure, 40 Fed. Reg. 51,656 (Nov. 6, 1975)); 













considerations that make these disclosures important to investment and 
voting decisions,” as well as the “potential challenges and costs associated 
with compiling and disclosing this information.”30 The Concept Release 
elicited over 25,000 comments.31 According to one review, 348 of those 
comments were unique while the rest were form comments solicited in 
response to public interest campaigns run by Public Citizen and Americans 
for Tax Fairness.32 Professor Harper Ho reports that “[t]he vast majority of 
the public comments to the Concept Release focused to some extent and 
often exclusively on ESG disclosure issues.” 33  Many commentators 
expressed support for ESG disclosure reform.34 
On October 1, 2018, Professors Cynthia Williams and Jill Fisch served 
the SEC with a formal petition for rulemaking on ESG disclosure.35 The 
petition, which was “signed by investors and associated organizations 
representing more than $5 trillion in assets under management,” argues that 
the “response to the Concept Release strongly suggests that it is time for the 
Commission to engage in a rulemaking process to develop a framework for 
public reporting companies to use to disclose specific, much higher-quality 
ESG information than is currently being produced pursuant either to 
voluntary initiatives or current SEC requirements.”36 The petition does not 
define what “ESG information” is, although it references specific examples 
such as climate change, political spending, gender pay ratios, human rights, 
and tax disclosure. 37  Nor does it claim that all such information is 
financially material, instead citing studies that purportedly confirm “the 
financial materiality of much ESG information.”38 Neither the petition nor 
the underlying studies cited specify which subset of ESG information is 
 
30. Id. at 23,970; see also id. at 23,971 (listing specific requests for comment). 
31. See SEC, Comments on Concept Release: Business and Financial Disclosure Required by 
Regulation S-K, https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616.htm [https://perma.cc/4U38-Y39C]. 
32. TYLER GELLASCH, TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY: A REVIEW OF COMMENTS TO THE 
SEC’S DISCLOSURE EFFECTIVENESS CONCEPT RELEASE 15 (2016), https://www.ussif.org/Files/Public_ 
Policy/Comment_Letters/Sustainable_Economy_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9ED-DVPU].  
33. Virginia Harper Ho, Disclosure Overload? Lessons for Risk Disclosure & ESG Reform from 
the Regulation S-K Concept Release, 65 VILL. L. REV. 67, 77 (2020).  
34. See SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., THE STATE OF DISCLOSURE 2016: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUSTAINABILITY DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS 4 (2016), https://w 
ww.sasb.org/knowledge-hub/state-of-disclosure-2016/ [https://perma.cc/87LN-MS5C] (reporting that 
two-thirds of non-form comment letters received addressed sustainability-related concerns and that 
eighty percent of those called for improved disclosure of sustainability-related information in SEC 
filings). For an in-depth analysis of these comments, see Harper Ho, supra note 33. 
35. Request for Rulemaking from Cynthia A. Williams & Jill E. Fisch to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, 
SEC (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-730.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6FP-T 
RBE]. 
36. Id. at cover letter, 2. 
37. See generally id. 
38. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 












financially material. The petition argues, however, that the level of interest 
investors have expressed in ESG supports the conclusion that ESG 
information is material.39 Voluntary ESG disclosure is inadequate to meet 
investor demands for this information, the petition explains, due to its poor 
quality and variability, which prohibits comparability across companies.40 
The petition therefore requests that the SEC “initiate rulemaking to develop 
mandatory rules for public companies to disclose high-quality, comparable, 
decision-useful environmental, social, and governance information.”41 The 
petition notes that a number of “promising” ESG disclosure frameworks 
have already been developed by private standard setters, but does not 
endorse any particular one.42  
On May 21, 2020, the SEC Investment Advisory Committee (IAC) 
similarly recommended that the SEC embark on an initiative to develop “an 
ESG disclosure framework,” explaining that the “message that we have 
heard consistently is that investors consider certain ESG information 
material” and that, “despite a plethora of data, there is a lack of material, 
comparable, consistent [ESG] information available.” 43  The 
recommendation defines ESG “as a broad set of subjects germane to 
businesses as highlighted by The Business Roundtable August 19, 2019 in 
its Statement of Purpose: customers, employees, suppliers, the community 
(environment), and shareholders.”44 Like the Williams & Fisch petition, the 
recommendation points the SEC to existing ESG disclosure frameworks to 
“help shape its thinking,” but stops short of “recommending or endorsing 
any particular standard.”45 
A bill titled the “ESG Disclosure Simplification Act” was reported out 
of the House Financial Services Committee in January 2020,46 and after 
reintroduction earlier this year passed in the House on June 16th by a one 
vote margin.47 The bill would require public companies to provide in their 
annual proxy statements a description of the company’s views “about the 
link between ESG metrics and the long-term business strategy” of the 
company and any process the company “uses to determine the impact of 
 
39. Id. at 6–9. 
40. Id. at 10. 
41. Id. at 16. 
42. Id. at 12. 
43. Investor-as-Owner Subcomm., SEC Inv. Advisory Comm., Recommendation Relating to 
ESG Disclosure 1–2 (May 14, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/ 
recommendation-of-the-investor-as-owner-subcommittee-on-esg-disclosure.pdf [https://perma.cc/T52 
H-666X]. 
44. Id. at 1 n.1. 
45. Id. at 10. 
46. ESG Disclosure Simplification Act of 2019, H.R. 4329, 116th Cong. (2020). 













ESG metrics on the long-term business strategy.”48  The bill would also 
require the SEC to require public companies “to disclose environmental, 
social, and governance metrics” in any filing that requires audited financial 
statements.49 The bill does not define “ESG metrics.” Instead, it requires the 
SEC to promulgate a definition through rulemaking.50 The bill does state, 
however, that “[i]t is the sense of Congress” that (as-yet undefined) ESG 
metrics “are de facto material for purposes of disclosures under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities Act of 1933.”51 The bill 
also authorizes the SEC to, as it may deem appropriate, “incorporate any 
internationally recognized, independent, multi-stakeholder environmental, 
social, and governance disclosure standards” when it promulgates a 
definition of ESG metrics.52 Like the Williams & Fisch petition and IAC 
recommendation, the bill does not endorse any particular existing set of 
ESG disclosure standards. 
In the wake of recent Democratic electoral victories and the Senate’s 
confirmation of Gary Gensler to replace Jay Clayton as Chairman of the 
SEC, we can expect the foregoing proposals to receive more serious 
attention than they have previously. Indeed, under the interim leadership of 
Commissioner Allison Lee pending Gensler’s confirmation earlier this year, 
the SEC created and staffed a new position titled “Senior Policy Advisor for 
Climate and ESG.”53 The Press Release announcing this move explained 
that the new advisor will “advise the agency on [ESG] matters and advance 
related new initiatives across [the SEC’s] offices and divisions.”54 Acting 
Chair Lee also requested public comment on climate change disclosure, 
indicating that “[i]n addition to climate-related disclosure, the staff is 
evaluating a range of disclosure issues under the heading of environmental, 
 
48. Id. § 2(a). 
49. Id. § 2(b)(1)(A). 
50. Id. § 2(b)(1)(B). 
51. Id. § 2(b)(3). 
52. Id. § 2(b)(4). The bill also calls for the creation of a permanent “Sustainable Finance 
Advisory Committee” which would, inter alia, be tasked with recommending “policy changes to 
facilitate the flow of capital towards sustainable investments, in particular environmentally sustainable 
investments.” Id. § 3. “Sustainable finance” is defined to mean “the provision of finance with respect to 
investments taking into account environmental, social, and governance considerations.” Id. Several other 
bills have been introduced in the House and Senate related to ESG disclosure. “These bills include 
disclosures on a variety of issues such as information regarding sexual harassment claims, financial and 
business risks associated with climate change, and the racial, ethnic, and gender composition of the 
board of directors and executives.” GAO, PUBLIC COMPANIES: DISCLOSURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL, 
SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE FACTORS AND OPTIONS TO ENHANCE THEM 38 n.52 (2020), https://www.ga 
o.gov/assets/710/707949.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R7T-ZZUS]. 
53. Press Release, SEC, Satyam Khanna Named Senior Policy Advisor for Climate and ESG 
(Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-20 [https://perma.cc/7R7T-ZZUS]. 
54. Id. 












social, and governance, or ESG, matters.” 55  Among the questions that 
comment is sought on are whether climate-related disclosures should be 
“one component of a broader ESG disclosure framework” and how the SEC 
should “craft climate-related disclosure requirements that would 
complement a broader ESG disclosure standard.”56 Professor John Coates, 
the Acting Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance, has also 
expressed his view that “[t]he SEC should help lead the creation of an 
effective ESG disclosure system,”57 and has indicated that the SEC is poised 
to move “promptly” on ESG rulemaking in 2021.58 
II. THE SEC’S TYPICAL APPROACH TO MANDATORY DISCLOSURE  
If information were costless to produce and costless to process, a strong 
case could be made for mandating full transparency on all issues related to 
a reporting company’s operations in its SEC filings, including the myriad 
topics that fall under the ESG umbrella, subject to countervailing 
competitive and privacy interests. In reality, of course, information is costly 
to produce and costly to process. To disclose information, companies must 
first collect it. This consumes resources that could otherwise be spent on the 
company’s core productive activities. The resources U.S. public companies 
spend collecting and assuring the accuracy of information required to be 
included in SEC filings is significant, not just because of the volume of 
information that companies are required to disclose, but also because of the 
unique liability risk that U.S. public companies face for inaccuracies in 
those filings. Although the point can be overstated, it is also the case that 
investors face cognitive limitations on their ability to process information, 
 
55. Allison Lee, Public Statement, Public Input Welcomed on Climate Change Disclosures 
(March 15, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-climate-change-disclosures [https://p 
erma.cc/HCC8-SB5Z]. 
56. Id. In March the SEC also announced the creation of a 22-member “Climate and ESG Task 
Force” in the Division of Enforcement. According to the Press Release, the Task Force, “[c]onsistent 
with increasing investor focus and reliance on climate and ESG-related disclosure and investment, [] 
will develop initiatives to proactively identify ESG-related misconduct.” Press Release, SEC, SEC 
Announces Enforcement Task Force Focused on Climate and ESG Issues (March 4, 2021), https://www. 
sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-42 [https://perma.cc/3TCE-5NMB]. 
57. John Coates, Public Statement, ESG Disclosure – Keeping Pace with Developments 
Affecting Investors, Public Companies and the Capital Markets, https://www.sec.gov/news/public-state 
ment/coates-esg-disclosure-keeping-pace-031121?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery [http 
s://perma.cc/AE9A-DDH5]. 
58. Andrew Ramonas, SEC to Move ‘Promptly’ on ESG Rulemaking in 2021, Official Says, 













meaning more information can sometimes detract from informed decision 
making.59 
Because information is costly to produce and process, the SEC has never 
required anything close to full disclosure in SEC filings. As a first cut, the 
SEC typically limits disclosure to items that meet a materiality threshold. 
The SEC defines material information as information that a “reasonable 
investor” would be substantially likely to consider important in making an 
investment decision.60 Who should count as a “reasonable investor” for 
purposes of this test is certainly debatable as a policy matter.61 But the SEC 
has taken the view that a reasonable investor is a rational investor who cares 
primarily about the financial performance of his or her investments. In 
rejecting past pleas to expand disclosure obligations to encompass matters 
primarily of social concern, the SEC has repeatedly emphasized its 
commitment to a financial conception of materiality.62 It is likely for this 
reason that many of the recent proposals calling for SEC-mandated ESG 
disclosure emphasize the ESG-financial performance link.63 But not even 
 
59. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448–49 (1978) (observing that burying 
shareholders “in an avalanche of trivial information . . . is hardly conducive to informed 
decisionmaking”); see also Harper Ho, supra note 33, at 119 (noting that 96% of issuers who provided 
comments on the SEC’s Concept Release argued that ESG disclosure would overwhelm investors with 
immaterial information, while 63% of investors who commented disagreed).  
60. Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act provides that the term “material,” when used to qualify a 
requirement for the furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information required to those 
matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in 
determining whether to buy or sell the securities registered. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2. The SEC adopted 
this definition of materiality in 1982 so it would align with the Supreme Court’s definition of materiality 
in securities litigation; the SEC previously defined as material “those matters as to which an average 
prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before buying or selling the security registered.” 
Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,925 (Apr. 22, 
2016). 
61. See Amanda M. Rose, The “Reasonable Investor” of Federal Securities Law: Insights from 
Tort Law’s “Reasonable Person” & Suggested Reforms, 43 J. CORP. L. 77, 89–93, 110–13 (2017). 
62. See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social 
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1246–63 (1999) (recounting this history). 
63. See Ann M. Lipton, Not Everything Is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder 
Disclosure, 37 YALE J. ON REG. 499, 554 (2020) (observing that “[b]ecause the SEC has taken the 
position that ‘materiality’ refers to information that has economic significance, most appeals for new 
rulemaking focus on the relevance of the requested information to corporate performance, regardless of 
the advocate’s true interest”). Some have described the shift toward the ESG lexicon as a “rebranding” 
of the socially responsible investing movement of the 1970s and 1980s. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, 
supra note 6, at 388 (observing that “ESG investing finds its roots in the socially responsible investing 
(SRI) movement” and that in the late 1990s and early 2000s “proponents of SRI rebranded the concept 
as ESG by adding corporate governance factors (the G in ESG), and they asserted that ESG investing 
could improve risk-adjusted returns”); see also Mariana Pargendler, The Rise of International Corporate 
Law, 98 WASH. U. L. REV 1764, 1795 (2021) (“Although socially responsible investing (especially 
focused on divestitures) had a long history, the ESG framing helped eliminate the traditional separation 
between socially responsible investment and mainstream investment.”). In addition to addressing 
 












the most ardent ESG supporters would contend that all ESG information is 
material, as the securities laws currently define that term. Corporations’ 
approach to certain ESG topics may impact their financial performance in a 
material way, whereas their approach to other ESG topics may not. 
Variations undoubtedly exist amongst industries and amongst companies 
within industries.64 Without specifying the particular topic that disclosure is 
sought on, it is impossible to assess whether the information is likely 
material under traditional conceptions of that term.  
Even with respect to material information, the SEC does not always 
mandate disclosure. Information need not be disclosed unless there is a 
specific duty to disclose it, or the information is both material and necessary 
to make other statements made not misleading. The decision to create a duty 
to disclose requires a weighing of, inter alia, the cost to companies of 
producing the information and the magnitude of the benefit to investors of 
the information’s production (not all material information is of equal 
importance). This requires a fact-specific, contextual analysis. For example, 
if the information is readily accessible given existing information systems, 
the cost of mandating disclosure will be less than if disclosure would require 
companies to create entirely new information systems. The appropriate form 
disclosure should take also necessitates a fact-specific, contextual analysis. 
Some ESG topics may lend themselves to principles-based disclosure, 
whereas others may warrant a more prescriptive form. There are well-
recognized tradeoffs between these two approaches, and those tradeoffs can 
only be assessed and debated in a concrete setting.65  
 
challenges related to the SEC’s conception of materiality, this rebranding made plausible arguments that 
ESG investing is consistent with an ERISA trustee’s fiduciary duties. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 25 
(arguing that rebranding SRI as ESG “enabled law firms to opine to their clients that ESG investing was 
fully compatible with the trustee’s fiduciary obligations”). 
64. As the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) has explained, “[s]ustainability 
issues are not material for all companies, and when they are material, they manifest in unique ways and 
require industry-specific metrics.” SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., BUSINESS AND FINANCIAL 
DISCLOSURE REQUIRED BY REGULATION S-K: THE SEC’S CONCEPT RELEASE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 3 
(2016), https://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Reg-SK-Comment-Bulletin-091416.pdf [htt 
ps://perma.cc/Z3RJ-3UDB]. Through a consultation process that spanned several years, SASB 
developed standards for over seventy industries that identify the subset of sustainability topics that are 
likely to be financially material for a company in that industry as well as recommended metrics for 
reporting on those topics; the standards recognize that whether a particular topic is in fact material is a 
judgment that can only be made at the firm level. For a description of SASB’s standard-setting process, 
see Standard-Setting Process, SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., https://www.sasb.org/standards 
/process/ [https://perma.cc/S75M-KRDT]. 
65. As the SEC recounted in the Concept Release: 
Limiting prescriptive disclosure requirements and emphasizing principles-based disclosure 
could improve disclosure by reducing the amount of information that may be irrelevant, 














Specificity is also required in order to assess whether a new mandatory 
disclosure obligation is necessary to elicit the information sought. Public 
companies are already required to disclose information on a variety of 
“ESG” topics. Extensive disclosures are required in annual proxy statements 
related to executive compensation and governance practices, for example.66 
Pursuant to Congressional mandate, the SEC has also required companies 
to disclose information related to mine safety and the use of conflict 
minerals.67 In addition, in 2010 the SEC issued guidance instructing that 
Items 101, 103, 303, and 503(c) of Regulation S-K can sometimes require 
disclosure of risks and costs posed by climate change, environmental 
regulation, and environmental litigation. 68  In 2011, it issued guidance 
explaining that information related to cybersecurity risks and breaches may 
need to be disclosed under these same provisions; that guidance also 
 
that is not necessarily material or important to investors, greater use of principles-based 
disclosure requirements may allow registrants to more effectively tailor their disclosure to 
provide only the information about their specific business and financial condition that is 
important to investors. A principles-based approach also may allow registrants to readily adapt 
their disclosure to facts and circumstances that may change over time.  
On the other hand, reducing prescriptive disclosure requirements and shifting towards more 
principles-based disclosure requirements may limit the comparability, consistency and 
completeness of disclosure. Also, in the absence of clear guidelines for determining when 
information is material, registrants may have difficulty applying principles-based disclosure 
requirements, and the disclosure provided may not give investors sufficient insight into how 
registrants apply different principles-based disclosure thresholds. Potentially important 
information that may be disclosed in response to a prescriptive disclosure requirement might 
not be included in response to a principles-based disclosure requirement. . . .  
Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,927 (Apr. 22, 
2016) (footnotes omitted). The SEC also described a third “objectives-oriented” approach that the SEC 
staff had proposed in a prior study for developing new accounting standards. “Under this approach, 
standard setters would develop new rules by clearly articulating the accounting objective of the standard 
and providing sufficient detail and structure so that the standard can be applied on a consistent basis.” 
Id.  
66. See ELIZABETH A. ISING, KRISTA P. HANVEY, GEOFFREY E. WALTER, HEATHER MARSHALL 
& BRIAN MYERS, DONNELLEY FIN. SOLS., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE HANDBOOK: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE SEC’S EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION DISCLOSURE RULES (2020), https://www. 
dfinsolutions.com/insights/guide/executive-compensation-disclosure-handbook [https://perma.cc/H4L7 
-NPXT]. 
67. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Dodd-Frank Mine Safety Disclosure Requirements 
(Dec. 21, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-273.htm [https://perma.cc/KAQ5-HD2R]; 
Fatima Alali & Sophia I-Ling Wang, Conflict Minerals Disclosure Requirements and Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Trends, Challenges, and Opportunities, CPA J. (July 2018), https://www.cpajournal.com 
/2018/07/18/conflict-minerals-disclosure-requirements-and-corporate-social-responsibility/ [https://per 
ma.cc/ZK24-FV2W]. “Conflict minerals” are defined as those originating in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo or an adjoining country. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p). It was “the sense of Congress that the 
exploitation and trade of conflict minerals . . . is helping to finance conflict characterized by extreme 
levels of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly sexual- and gender-
based violence, and contributing to an emergency humanitarian situation therein.” Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2213 (2010). 
68. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6289 
(Feb. 8, 2010). 












explains how cybersecurity-related information may impact disclosures in 
a company’s financial statements and in its discussion of the effectiveness 
of disclosure controls and procedures required by Item 307 of Regulation 
S-K. 69  The SEC revisited and augmented its cybersecurity guidance in 
2018, noting that Item 407(h) of Regulation S-K and Item 7 of Schedule 
14A can also create disclosure obligations concerning cybersecurity.70 
The general disclosure obligations cited in the SEC’s climate change and 
cybersecurity guidance may also, depending on the facts and circumstances, 
call for disclosures related to a variety of other topics that fall under the ESG 
umbrella. For example, Item 105 of Regulation S-K requires a registrant to 
provide, under the heading “Risk Factors,” a discussion of the material 
factors that make an investment in the registrant speculative or risky; Item 
303 of Regulation S-K (Management’s Discussion and Analysis of 
Financial Condition and Results of Operations, also known as the 
“MD&A”), requires issuers, inter alia, to identify and disclose known 
trends, events, demands, commitments, and uncertainties that are 
reasonably likely to have a material effect on financial condition or 
operating performance; and Item 407(h) of Regulation S-K and Item 7 of 
Schedule 14A require a company to disclose the extent of its board’s role in 
the risk oversight of the company, such as how the board administers its 
oversight function and the effect this has on the board’s leadership 
structure.71 With respect to the latter, the SEC has instructed that “disclosure 
about the board’s involvement in the oversight of the risk management 
process should provide important information to investors about how a 
company perceives the role of its board and the relationship between the 
board and senior management in managing the material risks facing the 
company,” as well as a description of how the board administers its risk 
oversight function.72 
If reasonable investors believe these obligations are failing to elicit 
sufficient disclosure on a particular ESG topic, the logical first question they 
should ask is why? Depending on the nature of the problem, the appropriate 
policy response may differ. Perhaps beefed-up surveillance of the topic as 
part of the SEC’s ongoing disclosure review program is in order.73 Perhaps 
 
69. CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2 – Cybersecurity, SEC (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.sec 
.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm [https://perma.cc/578N-XRV3].  
70. Commission Statement and Guidance on Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosures, 83 
Fed. Reg. 8166 (Feb. 26, 2018). 
71. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.105, 229.303, 229.407, 240.14a–101. 
72. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68333, 68345 (Dec. 23, 2009). 
73. While serving as Acting Chair, Commissioner Lee recently directed the SEC’s Division of 














additional interpretative guidance is called for, or perhaps a more 
prescriptive line-item disclosure obligation ought to be created. These are 
difficult questions that cannot be intelligently discussed in the abstract. 
Petitions that the SEC mandate disclosure of specific ESG topics, or 
provide interpretive guidance related thereto, have been introduced in the 
past, with mixed success. The climate change guidance mentioned above 
was adopted after a coalition of investors and environmental non-profits 
requested formal guidance in petitions filed with the Commission in 2007, 
2008, and 2009.74 Petitions calling for mandated disclosure of, inter alia, 
gender pay ratios75 and corporate political spending76 have not, by contrast, 
prompted SEC action to date.77 The SEC’s response to a recent petition 
seeking greater disclosure on human capital management illustrates well the 
difficult questions a decision to mandate disclosure on a specific ESG topic 
will necessarily raise.  
On July 6, 2017, the Human Capital Management Coalition (HCMC), 
comprised of institutional investors with roughly $3 trillion in assets, filed 
a petition seeking enhanced human capital management disclosure;78 the 
IAC followed suit with a recommendation that the SEC recognize the 
significance of human capital management to investors and incorporate 
 
Public Statement, Allison Herren Lee, Acting SEC Chair, Statement on the Review of Climate-Related 
Disclosure (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-statement-review-climate-r 
elated-disclosure [https://perma.cc/HCZ8-MWWG]. 
74. See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 
6289, 6291 n.20 (Feb. 8, 2010). 
75. See Letter from Sallie Krawcheck & Joseph F. Keefe, Chair and Chief Exec. Officer, Pax 
Ellevate, to Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2016/petn4-
696.pdf [https://perma.cc/TJH2-A79J]. 
76. See Letter from Comm. on Disclosure of Corp. Pol. Spending, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Sec’y, SEC (Aug. 3, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-637.pdf [https://perma.cc/9 
LQV-MZ8L]. 
77. A December 2020 policy rider to an appropriations law currently prevents the SEC from 
issuing disclosure mandates related to political spending, but a bill introduced in the House in January 
would repeal that roadblock if enacted into law. See Transparency in Corporate Political Spending Act, 
H.R. 403, 117th Cong. (2021). At his confirmation hearing, Chairman Gensler expressed his view that the 
SEC should consider mandating disclosure on political spending (Zachary Warmbrodt, Gensler: SEC 
Should Consider Corporate Political Spending Disclosures, POLITICO (March 2, 2021, 2:07 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/03/02/gensler-sec-corporate-political-spending-472607), and the 
Acting Director of the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance is a long-time advocate for such 
disclosure (see, e.g., John C. Coates & Taylor Lincoln, Opinion, Fulfilling the Promise of ‘Citizens 
United’, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/fulfilling-the-promise 
-of-citizens-united/2011/09/02/gIQAa4np7J_story.html). 
78. See Letter from Hum. Cap. Mgmt. Coal., to William Hinman, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC 
(July 6, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2017/petn4-711.pdf [https://perma.cc/PF5P-TDW 
C]. The petition generated a substantial number of comments supporting increased disclosure of human 
capital management policies and specific human capital metrics. See Comments on Rulemaking Petition 
to Require Issuers to Disclose Information About Their Human Capital Management Policies, Practices 
and Performance, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-711/4-711.htm [https://perma.cc/A68J-VBV 
S]. 












enhanced disclosures as part of its overall efforts to modernize corporate 
reporting and disclosure.79 In August 2019, the SEC proposed amendments 
to Items 101, 103, and 105 of Regulation S-K.80 In recognition of the fact 
that human capital has grown in importance as a resource and driver of 
performance for certain companies since the time Regulation S-K was first 
adopted, the SEC included among the proposed changes to Item 101 
(description of business) a new obligation requiring “[a] description of the 
registrant’s human capital resources, including in such description any 
human capital measures or objectives that management focuses on in 
managing the business.”81 The proposed amendment provided as examples, 
“depending on the nature of the registrant’s business and workforce, 
measures or objectives that address the attraction, development, and 
retention of personnel.”82 
Notably, the proposed rule called for purely principles-based disclosure 
and was cabined with a materiality qualifier. By contrast, the HCMC 
petition had favored coupling principles-based disclosure with obligations 
to disclose a wide array of specific workforce-related information, 
including:  
(1) Workforce demographics (number of full-time and part-time 
workers, number of contingent workers, policies on and use of 
subcontracting and outsourcing); (2) Workforce stability (turnover 
(voluntary and involuntary), internal hire rate); (3) Workforce 
composition (diversity, pay equity policies/audits/ratios); (4) 
Workforce skills and capabilities (training, alignment with business 
strategy, skills gaps); (5) Workforce culture and empowerment 
(employee engagement, union representation, work-life initiatives); 
(6) Workforce health and safety (work-related injuries and fatalities, 
lost day rate); (7) Workforce productivity (return on cost of 
workforce, profit/revenue per full-time employee); (8) Human rights 
commitments and their implementation (principles used to evaluate 
risk, constituency consultation processes, supplier due diligence); 
[and] (9) Workforce compensation and incentives (bonus metrics 
used for employees below the named executive officer level, 
 
79. See SEC, Recommendation of the Investor Advisory Committee, Human Capital 
Management Disclosure (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-
2012/human-capital-disclosure-recommendation.pdf. [https://perma.cc/A82U-3YYB]. Many comment 
letters submitted in response to the SEC’s April 15, 2016, Concept Release on Regulation S-K also 
expressed desires for improved disclosures related to human capital management. See supra note 31. 
80. Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, 84 Fed. Reg. 44,358 (Aug. 23, 
2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239 & 240). 














measures to counterbalance risks created by incentives).83  
The petition argued that prescriptively requiring this information would 
make it easier for investors to extract through an automated process and 
would promote consistency and comparability.84  
In defense of its principles-based approach, the SEC explained that: 
In assessing the best way to approach disclosure regarding human 
capital, we were mindful that each industry, and even each company 
within a specific industry, has its own human capital considerations, 
and that those considerations may evolve over time. In light of this 
fact, and with the principle of materiality in mind, it is our view that 
prescribing fixed, specific line item disclosures in this area for all 
registrants would not resu lt in the most meaningful disclosure.85  
Instead, the SEC concluded “that investors would be better served by 
understanding how each company looks at its human capital and, in 
particular, where management focuses its attention in this space.”86  
The public comments the proposed rule elicited raised numerous 
issues. 87  Some commentators argued there was no need for any new 
disclosure obligations related to human capital, due to sufficient voluntary 
disclosure and/or existing disclosure obligations under Items 105 and 303 
that would be triggered if the topic presented a material risk to the 
company.88  Some highlighted the costs associated with compliance, 
including the potential need to disclose competitively sensitive 
information.89 Others supported the principles-based nature of the rule but 
saw no need for calling out specific examples of measures or objectives 
companies might report, while still others wanted additional examples.90 
Many commentators expressed the need for more prescriptive requirements 
along the lines suggested by HCMC. 91  Some favored the issuance of 
interpretative guidance rather than rule change.92 On August 26, 2020, the 
 
83. Letter from Hum. Cap. Mgmt. Coal., supra note 78, at 26–27 (punctuation altered) (footnote 
omitted). 
84. Id. at 27. 
85. Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, 84 Fed. Reg. at 44,370. 
86. Id. 
87. See generally Doreen E. Lilienfeld & Max Bradley, Securities Disclosure: Human Capital 
Management Disclosure, 33 INSIGHTS 24 (2019) (describing the proposed rule and summarizing the 
comments received).  
88. See id. at 26–27. 
89. See id. at 27. 
90. See id. at 27–29. 
91. See id. at 27–28. 
92. See id. at 28. 












SEC adopted the proposed rule substantially as proposed, with Democratic 
Commissioners Lee and Caroline Crenshaw dissenting.93 
III. ISSUES RAISED BY CALLS FOR AN SEC-MANDATED ESG DISCLOSURE 
FRAMEWORK 
The recent proposals described in Part I do not request that the SEC 
mandate disclosure on any specific ESG topic, and thus do not purport to 
provide answers to the series of difficult questions a more targeted request 
would trigger: Is the topic financially material? To all companies, or just 
some? Why is sufficient information on the topic not being produced 
pursuant to existing disclosure obligations? Is rulemaking the best fix? What 
form should a new rule take and, relatedly, what is the associated cost? 
Instead, the proposals invite the SEC to adopt a comprehensive ESG 
disclosure framework. Requesting that the SEC adopt a framework for 
companies to use to disclose information on a broad set of topics, without 
establishing that any one of those topics is in fact financially material, is an 
unusual foray into SEC rulemaking. The most compelling justification for 
grouping ESG topics in this way, rather than treating each ESG issue 
discretely—like any other business practice or risk that may (or may not) 
warrant mandatory disclosure—is that the topics are already grouped 
together under existing ESG reporting frameworks created by private 
standard setters.  
These existing frameworks, however, were not—with one exception—
designed with the SEC’s disclosure regime in mind. The most popular 
framework, cited as an exemplar the SEC might look to in both the Williams 
& Fisch petition and the IAC recommendation, was developed by the non-
profit Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). The “modular, interrelated GRI 
Standards are designed primarily to be used as a set, to prepare a 
sustainability report focused on material topics,”94 with a “material topic” 
defined as a topic “that reflects a reporting organization’s significant 
economic, environmental and social impacts; or that substantively 
influences the assessments and decisions of stakeholders.” 95  The 
 
93. See Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, 85 Fed. Reg. 63,726 (Oct. 8, 
2020) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 239 & 240). For an academic critique of the form the final 
rule took, see George S. Georgiev, The Human Capital Management Movement in U.S. Corporate Law, 
95 TULANE L. REV. 639, 713–723 (2021). 
94. How to Use the GRI Standards, GRI, https://www.globalreporting.org/how-to-use-the-gri-st 
andards/gri-standards-english-language/ [https://perma.cc/J9JU-CXXQ].  
95. GRI, GRI STANDARDS GLOSSARY 14 (2020). Stakeholders are defined as “entit[ies] or 














Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) is a non-profit standard 
setter that has uniquely developed a set of industry-specific sustainability 
standards tethered (at least for now) to the SEC’s definition of materiality.96 
Neither the Williams & Fisch petition nor the IAC recommendation nor the 
House Bill endorse the SASB standards over the GRI standards, however, 
suggesting that the proponents behind these proposals are not especially 
concerned about financial materiality.97 In a subsequent paper, Professor 
Fisch candidly admits that the link between ESG performance and firm 
performance is highly contested, arguing that enhanced ESG disclosure is 
nevertheless appropriate because it will help investors determine whether 
sustainability practices materially impact firm performance.98 The House 
Bill is clear about its willingness to have the SEC adopt an ESG disclosure 
 
activities, products and services,” including “those who are invested in the organization (such as 
employees and shareholders), as well as those who have other relationships to the organization (such as 
other workers who are not employees, suppliers, vulnerable groups, local communities, and NGOs or 
other civil society organizations, among others).” Id. at 20. 
96. See SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., SASB CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 9 (2017), h 
ttps://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/SASB_Conceptual-Framework_WATERMARK.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EQ83-KRD9] (“In identifying sustainability topics that are reasonably likely to have 
material impacts, the SASB applies the definition of ‘materiality’ established under the U.S. securities 
laws.”); see also SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., supra note 64. SASB is in the process of 
revising its definition of materiality “to more effectively communicate the global nature of the concept 
of financial materiality … [and] to align as much as reasonably possible with the definition of 
‘materiality’ used by the standard setters and other organizations who, like SASB, have a focus on the 
information needs of the providers of capital.” SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., PROPOSED 
CHANGES TO THE SASB CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK & RULES OF PROCEDURE 7 (2020), https://www.wl 
rk.com/docs/SASB_Proposed_Changes.pdf. Specifically, the proposed revision states that information 
“is financially material if omitting, misstating, or obscuring it could reasonably be expected to influence 
investment or lending decisions that users make on the basis of their assessments of short-, medium-, 
and long-term financial performance and enterprise value.” Id. Commentators have argued that SASB’s 
proposed incorporation of time horizons into its materiality definition represents a “deliberate step” 
toward the concept of “dynamic materiality,” which “is viewed in Europe as a far more ‘forward-looking 
and proactive’ approach than the traditional U.S. definition” of materiality. David A. Katz & Laura A. 
McIntosh, ‘Materiality’ in America and Abroad, HARV. L. SCH. FRM. CORP. GOVN. (May 1, 2021), https 
://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/05/01/corporate-governance-update-materiality-in-america-and-abroa 
d/ [https://perma.cc/7ECC-APEX] (explaining that the concept of “dynamic materiality” originated with 
a 2020 white paper by the World Economic Forum and describes a process whereby “[w]hat is 
financially immaterial to a company or industry today can become material tomorrow”). 
97. A preference for prescriptive, mandatory ESG disclosures may also help explain this. 
SASB’s standards offer guidance to companies in assessing their existing disclosure obligations under 
Regulation S-K, specifically as it relates to their MD&A. See SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD, 
supra note 96, at 1 (“SASB standards are designed for voluntary use in disclosures required by existing 
U.S. regulation in filings with the [SEC], such as Forms 10-K and 20-F.”). SASB’s standards describe 
industry-specific sustainability topics that may present known trends and uncertainties reasonably likely 
to materially affect financial condition or operating performance and offer metrics for reporting on those 
topics. Id. at 9. SASB leaves it to companies to make the call whether a particular sustainability topic is 
in fact material, id., and it has taken the position that additional line-item ESG disclosures are not 
appropriate, see SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., supra note 64, at 3. 
98. Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 923, 925–26 
(2019).  












framework that extends beyond traditional notions of financial 
materiality—it expressly permits the SEC to “incorporate any 
internationally recognized, independent, multi-stakeholder environmental, 
social, and governance disclosure standards” when it promulgates a 
definition of ESG metrics, declaring such metrics to be “de facto 
material.”99  
If the SEC were to codify, perhaps with tweaks and modifications, an 
existing ESG-disclosure framework that has been developed by private 
standard-setters without strict regard for traditional securities-law 
conceptions of what counts as material, what would be the implications? 
Proponents argue that a large number of companies are already collecting 
and disclosing ESG information and publishing it in sustainability reports, 
and that requiring the information to be standardized and placed in SEC 
filings would promote the consistency, comparability, and credibility of 
those disclosures. 100  This would, to the extent the ESG information is 
financially material, be helpful to “reasonable” investors, as that term is 
currently understood, even if some of the information produced would be 
important only to values-based investors or other stakeholders. These 
arguments are not without weight, but such a request raises significant 
questions.  
Most obviously, what will it cost to achieve the envisioned benefits to 
users of ESG information? An SEC-mandated ESG disclosure regime 
would impose new information-gathering and reporting obligations on 
companies that today do not prepare sustainability reports pursuant to 
whatever framework the SEC were to adopt. Even companies that do 
currently utilize that framework when preparing sustainability reports 
would bear additional costs, because the process for preparing SEC filings 
is much more rigorous and involved.101  
Deeper, more philosophical questions lurk as well. For example, 
questions of institutional competence and democratic accountability loom 
large. When the SEC mandates disclosure of information because of its 
demonstrable importance to companies’ financial performance, it clearly 
acts within the scope of both its expertise and authority. Asking the SEC to 
choose an ESG disclosure framework based in part on considerations that 
 
99. See ESG Disclosure Simplification Act of 2019, H.R. 4329, 116th Cong. § 2(b)(3)–(4) 
(2019). 
100. See supra Part I. 
101. See Fisch, supra note 98, at 959 (observing that “[p]rivate organizations such as GRI and 
SASB have identified dozens of disclosure items, and current sustainability reports commonly exceed 
one hundred pages in length,” and noting that the “cost of developing and complying with comparable 













extend into the realm of politics thrusts the SEC into a less familiar and 
more controversial role. Is the SEC the right institution to do this?102  
Questions of institutional competence and democratic accountability are 
particularly significant because advocates for ESG disclosure clearly see it 
as a mechanism for promoting certain types of corporate behavior and 
discouraging others. 103  Mandating that such disclosures appear in SEC 
filings would amplify this effect by involving the board and executives who 
certify SEC filings in the ESG disclosure process. Advocates view this as a 
benefit of SEC-mandated ESG disclosure.104 As is often pointed out, this 
would not be first time the SEC has adopted a position that appears to be at 
 
102. SEC Commissioner A. A. Sommer, Jr. raised this concern in response to pressure in the mid-
1970s to expand the concept of materiality to capture social disclosures. See A. A. Sommer Jr., Comm’r, 
SEC, Address at the Practising Law Institute: The Slippery Slope of Materiality (Dec. 8, 1975), https://w 
ww.sec.gov/news/speech/1975/120875sommer.pdf [https://perma.cc/89YR-WX36] (warning that 
“overloading [the concept of materiality], unduly burdening it, excessively expanding it, may result in 
significant changes in the role of the Commission, the role of other enforcement agencies, and our ability 
to carry out our statutory duties”). SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce echoed the concern in a speech 
responding to calls for greater ESG disclosure last year. See Public Statement, Hester M. Peirce, 
Comm’r, SEC, Statement on Proposed Amendments to Modernize and Enhance Financial Disclosures 
(Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/peirce-mda-2020-01-30 [https://perma.cc/ 
LPJ5-MM7T] (“Securities regulators of this generation must not grow weak-kneed in defending the 
concept of materiality, which continues to play a central role in ensuring the vibrancy of our capital 
markets. We ought not step outside our lane and take on the role of environmental regulator or social 
engineer.”); see also Mahoney & Mahoney, supra note 14, at 2–3 (arguing that the SEC “has neither the 
expertise nor the political accountability to pursue climate, diversity, and other public policy goals” and 
warning that if the SEC adopts an ESG disclosure regime it risks “eroding public trust in its capacity 
and willingness to serve as an apolitical technocratic regulator of the capital markets”); cf. Yoon-Ho 
Alex Lee, Beyond Agency Core Mission, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 558 (2016) (arguing that “the concept 
of agency core mission, as such, should no longer have a prominent role in critically evaluating agency 
regulations or Congress’s regulatory assignments”). 
103. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 63, at 532 (asserting that “[t]he goal, in short, is to make 
sustainability information relevant to financial performance, even if it is not currently, by empowering 
noninvestor groups to pressure corporations into improving their behavior” and that, “[f]ar from 
pursuing investor wealth, much of the sustainability movement is designed to make corporate profits 
difficult to achieve unless management attends to the needs of noninvestor stakeholders”); Mahoney & 
Mahoney, supra note 14, at 8–12 (arguing that the goal of ESG proponents is to change firm behavior 
in socially motivated directions); see also Virginia Harper Ho, Non-Financial Reporting & Corporate 
Governance: Explaining American Divergence & Its Implications for Disclosure Reform, 10 ACCT., 
ECON., & L. 1, 12 (2020) (observing that “disclosure is widely recognized as a soft form of regulation, 
incentivizing changes in corporate behavior where direct regulation may be difficult to achieve or 
enforce”). 
104. See, e.g., Ruth Jebe, The Convergence of Financial and ESG Materiality: Taking 
Sustainability Mainstream, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 645, 669 (2019) (warning that “as long as sustainability 
disclosure remains separate from required disclosure, changes in corporate conduct will be few and 
slow”); Fisch, supra note 98, at 962 (explaining that SEC-mandated sustainability disclosures “will lead 
to the board of directors being accountable for sustainability disclosures in a way in that they are not in 
the current system” and that the “board’s role in overseeing and certifying the sustainability disclosures 
will require that they set up reporting systems” which, in turn “will both improve the reliability of the 
disclosures and provide the board with a greater role in overseeing and understanding the issuer’s 
sustainability practices,” enabling it “to incorporate sustainability considerations into its analysis of 
strategic issues and operational risk management”). 












least in part motivated by a desire to affect corporate behavior. 105  Its 
position on the qualitative materiality of information related to management 
integrity (including managers’ involvement in illegal activity) is one 
commonly cited example.106 But when the SEC has gone down this path in 
the past it has sparked considerable controversy, because using disclosure 
rules to influence corporate behavior operates to blur the line between the 
domains of federal securities regulation and state corporate law.107 Critics 
contend that federalizing aspects of corporate governance inhibits the ability 
of states to compete for corporate charters, thus undermining the “genius” 
of American corporate law.108  
Moreover, when the SEC has done this in the past, the behavioral 
changes sought have been at least ostensibly compatible with underlying 
principles of state corporate law. For example, it is a breach of fiduciary 
duty under Delaware corporate law for directors and officers to knowingly 
 
105. See Request for Rulemaking from Cynthia A. Williams & Jill E. Fisch, supra note 35, at 7; 
see also Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections 
upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859 (2003) (exploring how federal securities law and enforcement 
via securities fraud class actions plays an important role in regulating corporate governance); Donald C. 
Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the 
JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 373 (2013) (surveying “where we think the securities law responsibilities 
of public companies have motivations and explanations not strictly confined to their contributions to 
investor protection or capital formation”). 
106. See Williams, supra note 62, at 1265–66.  
107. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 63, at 549 (explaining that the SEC’s treatment of issues related 
to management integrity as qualitatively material “kicked off years of controversy, with detractors 
arguing that the SEC was using securities disclosure to shape corporate behavior in a manner that went 
beyond investor and market protection, and champions defending the practice for the same reason” and 
citing contributions to the debate) (footnotes omitted); see also Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 635 (2003) (explaining that “[a]bsent a constitutional bar to federal involvement 
in corporate affairs, the federal government can determine, has determined, and will determine many 
critical elements of corporate governance” at the expense of historical state control).  
108. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993). For an overview 
of the arguments for and against charter competition, see Frederick Tung, Lost in Translation: From 
U.S. Corporate Charter Competition to Issuer Choice in International Securities Regulation, 39 GA. L. 
REV. 525, 536–39 (2005). See also Hester Peirce, SEC, Public Statement, Rethinking Global ESG 
Metrics (April 14, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/rethinking-global-esg-metrics [ht 
tps://perma.cc/Q945-QDJZ] (warning that common ESG disclosure metrics “will drive and homogenize 
capital allocation decisions” with detrimental effects on society); Hans B. Christensen, Luzi Hail & 
Christian Leuz, Mandatory CSR and Sustainability Reporting: Economic Analysis and Literature 
Review, 3, 58–70 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 623, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.c 
om/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3427748 (observing that new disclosure mandates are popular because 
viewed as less intrusive and more politically expedient than traditional regulation, but warning that 
mandatory disclosure regimes can have negative unintended consequences and outlining the potential 
effects on firm behavior of mandatory ESG disclosure mandates); Mahoney & Mahoney, supra note 14, 
at 23–24 (warning that SEC-mandated ESG disclosure may harm retail investors by reducing incentives 













cause the company to violate positive law.109 The behavior sought to be 
promoted by ESG disclosure, by contrast, conflicts with Delaware corporate 
law to the extent it promotes the prioritization of non-shareholder 
constituencies in corporate decision-making.110 Even if the behavior sought 
can be defended as promoting “long-term” shareholder interests,111 ESG 
topics veer far deeper into matters of traditional business judgment than the 
SEC has ever waded before. 
Of course, those who support SEC-mandated ESG disclosure may not be 
ardent supporters of shareholder primacy. And they may even support the 
complete federalization of corporate law. Thus, these observations may not 
change their views. That is not my intent. Rather, it is to focus attention on 
the fact that broad calls for SEC-mandated ESG disclosure raise some of the 
most contested questions in the field of corporate law, such as the value of 
interjurisdictional competition for corporate charters,112 the right way to 
conceptualize the purpose of the corporation,113 and the proper allocation of 
managerial power as between the board and shareholders.114 
The ESG disclosure mandates that have been imposed on listed 
companies in the EU since 2018115 are explicitly tied to the EU’s substantive 
 
109. See Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013, 
2019–21 (2019) (discussing jurisprudence holding that directors and officers who act with intent to 
violate positive law breach their duty of good faith). 
110. This is, at least, the predominant view. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End 
of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 444–51 (2001) (describing this as the “consensus” 
view); cf. Rock, supra note 4 (noting the reinvigorated debate over corporate purpose). See also Hans, 
et al., supra note 108, at 94 (observing that “if the goal is to drive change in firm behavior” for social 
ends, an ESG standard setting process requires “a broader democratic legitimization than what financial 
reporting standard setting usually has; it needs to be more akin to what we require for other major 
regulatory interventions (e.g., taxes or emission limits)”). 
111. Cf. Mark J. Roe & Roy Shapira, The Power of the Narrative in Corporate Lawmaking (Harv. 
L. Sch., Working Paper No. 20-21, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3703882 [https://perma.cc/42MT-
YDSL] (questioning the politically popular narrative that corporate short-termism is a pervasive 
problem). 
112. See Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. 
CORP. L. 33, 43 n.33 (2006) (observing that “[f]or thirty-odd years, corporate scholars have debated 
whether corporate charter competition benefits investors or only self-serving firm managers,” and citing 
the seminal works addressing whether there is a “race-to-the-top” or “race-to-the-bottom” in American 
corporate law). 
113. See A. A. Sommer, Jr., Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate 
Revisited Sixty Years Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 36–39 (1991) (tracing the history of this vigorous 
debate); see also Rock, supra note 4 (discussing the debate in current times). 
114. For a recent overview of the debate between those who favor board primacy and those who 
favor shareholder primacy, as well as references to leading works, see Simone M. Sepe, Board and 
Shareholder Power, Revisited, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1377, 1386–91 (2017). 
115. Since 2018, listed companies in the EU have been required to include information in their 
annual reports on the topics of environmental protection, social responsibility and treatment of 
employees, respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery, and diversity on company boards (in 
terms of age, gender, educational, and professional background). See Non-Financial Reporting, EUR. 
 












policy embrace of the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals.116 
Moreover, they were promulgated pursuant to a call by the European 
Parliament to create disclosure requirements that  
take account of the multidimensional nature of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and the diversity of the CSR policies 
implemented by businesses matched by a sufficient level of 
comparability to meet the needs of investors and other stakeholders 
as well as the need to provide consumers with easy access to 
information on the impact of businesses on society.117 
The SEC would be acting, by contrast, without predicate acts by political 
bodies endorsing the substantive ends sought.118  
Notably, the EU has not yet chosen to mandate any particular ESG 
reporting framework, instead issuing non-mandatory guidelines on how to 
present the required information while giving companies the option to 
instead use “international, European or national guidelines according to 
their own characteristics or business environment.”119 The inability of the 
EU, which has been actively considering sustainability issues for many 
years, to settle on a single disclosure framework highlights the difficulties 
the SEC will confront should it move forward with the pending requests. 
Placing responsibility for developing an ESG disclosure framework on 
the SEC also raises questions about resource allocation. If the SEC 
mandates disclosure on a topic, it assumes a responsibility for ensuring 
compliance, either through its screening of SEC filings or through 




116. Communication from the Commission on Guidelines on Non-Financial Reporting 
(Methodology for Reporting Non-Financial Information), 2017 O.J. (C 215) 1, 2 (EU). 
117. Directive 2014/95, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 
Amending Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Information by 
Certain Large Undertakings and Groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330) 1, 1.  
118. See Harper Ho, supra note 103, at 9 (observing that “the institutional foundations of emerging 
non-financial reporting and sustainability-oriented policies outside the U.S. include an emphasis on 
stakeholder interests, a comfort with the government’s guiding role in the economy, and a far greater 
reliance on flexible principles-based disclosure approaches and on regulatory enforcement rather than 
on prescriptive rules and enforcement through shareholder litigation,” and that “all of these stand in stark 
contrast to the norms and practices that shape the perspectives of U.S. regulators, legislators, and 
reporting companies themselves”). 
119. EUR. COMM’N, supra note 115. But see EFRAG Mandated to Provide Recommendations on 
Possible European Non-Financial Reporting Standards, EUR. FIN. REPORTING ADVISORY GRP. (Feb. 7, 
2020), https://www.efrag.org/News/Public-243/EFRAG-mandated-to-provide-recommendations-on-po 
ssible-European-Non-Financial-Reporting-Standards [https://perma.cc/8EC4-RRUN] (reporting that 
the European Commission has mandated EFRAG to undertake preparatory work for the elaboration of 













promote the integrity and completeness of companies’ ESG disclosures, 
combatting the problem of “greenwashing” that many believe is prevalent 
today.120 But unless the SEC’s budget is increased, this will necessarily 
divert resources from other SEC priorities. That diversion may be 
warranted, but it is a cost that must be explicitly weighed in the 
discussion.121 
Placing ESG disclosures in SEC filings also heightens the private 
liability risk faced by companies and directors and officers. This is perhaps 
the biggest elephant in the room. While ESG disclosures in stand-alone 
sustainability reports can theoretically give rise to private securities fraud 
liability, mandating that such disclosures be included in SEC filings 
heightens that risk considerably. First, stand-alone sustainability reports are 
not subject to the certification requirements imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act that operate to heighten the liability exposure of CEOs and CFOs.122 
Disclosures in stand-alone sustainability reports also avoid exposure to 
Section 11 liability and to Rule 14a-9 liability, because Section 11 applies 
only to misrepresentations and omissions in a company’s registration 
statement filed with the SEC in connection with a public offering123 and 
Rule 14a-9 applies only to misrepresentations and omissions in a company’s 
proxy solicitation materials.124 Such disclosures are also less exposed to 
litigation under Rule 10b-5.125 This is because sustainability reports have 
multiple audiences, so it remains open to a company to argue that a topic 
covered in such a report was not material within the meaning of the 
securities laws and did not affect its stock price. Companies also have 
freedom to couch statements in sustainability reports in aspirational or 
vague terms, which can help to reduce liability risk.126 Indeed, some law 
firms recommend that companies phrase ESG disclosures in these terms for 
 
120. See Fisch, supra note 98, at 963 (arguing that sustainability disclosures should be included 
within securities filings in part because it “would subject issuers’ sustainability disclosures to SEC 
oversight and enforcement and clarify that fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions are actionable 
as securities fraud”). 
121. See Sommer, supra note 102, at 20 (warning that “[t]he hasty expansion of materiality 
concepts [to encompass matters of social concern] may well result in a strain on the resources of the 
Commission that will impair seriously its ability to do that which it has classically done so well—police 
the disclosure system and the securities markets”). 
122. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-14, 240.15d-14. 
123. 15 U.S.C. § 77k. 
124. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9. 
125. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
126. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Social Issues in the Spotlight: The Increasing Need to Improve 
Publicly-Held Companies’ CSR and ESG Disclosures, 33 U. PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming 2021) 
(manuscript at 33), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3615327 [https://perma.cc/4EHK-23Q2] (observing that 
“generalized statements about a company’s commitment to ethical conduct likely will be considered 
aspirational and hence not materially misleading”).  












precisely this reason.127 SEC-mandated disclosure would likely reduce this 
flexibility. As a consequence of the foregoing, it would be more difficult for 
a company to argue against the materiality of ESG information, at least in a 
manner that might support a motion to dismiss. Indeed, the House bill would 
render ESG disclosures “de facto” material.128  
Some may perceive this as a benefit.129 But others would view it as a 
major cost. The debate over the social value of “fraud-on-the-market” 
securities-fraud class actions is long-standing and passionate.130 Fraud-on-
the-market class actions threaten to impose massive damages on defendants 
and thus may have settlement value out of proportion to their merits, 
inviting strike suit litigation that taxes companies—and ultimately 
shareholders—and threatens to affect corporate disclosure practices in 
socially undesirable ways.131 Concerns over strike suit litigation led to the 
adoption of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 1995, 
which makes it more difficult for a securities-fraud class action to get past 
a motion to dismiss.132 Most importantly, the PSLRA requires plaintiffs to 
plead particularized facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter and 
imposes a discovery stay until after a motion to dismiss has been decided.133 
It also contains a safe harbor for forward-looking statements accompanied 
by meaningful cautionary language or made without actual knowledge of 
their falsity.134 The predictable form lawsuits related to ESG disclosures 
 
127. See, e.g., SOC’Y FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE & GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, LEGAL 
RISKS AND ESG DISCLOSURES: WHAT CORPORATE SECRETARIES SHOULD KNOW 16–17 (2018), https:// 
www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Ising-Garbow-Meltzer-McPhee-White-Assaf-Leg 
al-Risks-and-ESG-Disclosures-What-Corporate-Secretaries-Should-Know.pdf [https://perma.cc/5E6C-
SA4G]; JONES DAY, MANAGING LEGAL RISKS FOR ESG DISCLOSURES UNDER U.S. LAW 3 (2019), https 
://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2019/07/managing-legal-risks-for-esg-disclosures-us-law [https://per 
ma.cc/8B9Z-GT6D]. This suggests that another potential way to achieve more robust ESG disclosure is 
to insulate such disclosures from liability exposure rather than heightening such exposure. Cf. Hazen, 
supra note 126, at 36–40 (suggesting that the SEC adopt a liability safe harbor rule to encourage ESG 
disclosures). 
128. See ESG Disclosure Simplification Act of 2019, H.R. 4329, 116th Cong. § 2(b)(3) (2020). 
129. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 98, at 965 (taking the position that, when it comes to policing 
SEC-mandated ESG disclosures, “private enforcement is likely to serve as a valuable supplement to 
public enforcement”). 
130. For an overview of the debate, see Amanda Marie Rose, The Shifting Raison d’Etre of the 
Rule 10b-5 Private Right of Action, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER 
LITIGATION 39 (Sean Griffith, Jessica Erickson, David H. Webber & Verity Winship, eds., 2018). 
131. See id.; see also Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring 
the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 
1326–49 (2008) (exploring why private enforcement of Rule 10b-5 may lead to overenforcement and 
how it can complicate efforts to approximate optimal deterrence). 
132. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). 
133. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b). 













will take are of a sort, however, that are often immune from the PSLRA’s 
protections against abusive litigation. 
Imagine a company that has an industrial accident, or finds itself 
embroiled in a sexual harassment scandal, or experiences a cybersecurity 
breach. These are events that even the most prudently managed corporation 
cannot completely protect against, at least not at acceptable cost. They are 
also events that, when made public, can result in a meaningful stock-price 
decline. Imagine also that the company has in the past made representations 
in its SEC filings that speak to the company’s management of workplace 
safety, human relations, or cybersecurity risks, as the case may be. Imagine 
further that a Rule 10b-5 class action is filed alleging that the relevant 
disclosures were misleading half-truths that helped the company maintain 
an artificially inflated stock price, because the company did not disclose 
facts available to the board which, at least in hindsight, appear to have 
suggested the unfortunate event was likely to occur or that the risk 
management strategies the company was undertaking were inadequate.  
Cases like this—commonly referred to as “event-driven” securities 
litigation—have increased in prevalence in recent years, 135  and SEC-
 
135. See Kevin LaCroix, First, Wildfires. Then What? Securities Litigation, of Course, D&O 
DIARY (Nov. 18, 2018), https://www.dandodiary.com/2018/11/articles/securities-litigation/first-wildfir 
es-securities-litigation-course/ [https://perma.cc/G8FD-334W] (explaining that fewer financial frauds 
have led to more event-driven securities class actions, where “the plaintiffs seek to rely on problems the 
defendant companies have experienced in their operations that caused their share price to drop,” and that 
the rise in these suits is “one of the significant factors explaining why the number of securities lawsuits 
filings is so high above historical norms”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Securities Litigation in 2017: “It Was 
the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times”, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (Mar. 19, 2018), https:// 
clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/03/19/securities-litigation-in-2017-it-was-the-best-of-times-it-was-t 
he-worst-of-times/ [https://perma.cc/FEV9-7LVN] (describing the “new trend” of “event-driven” class 
actions, where an adverse event like “an explosion, a crash, a mass torts episode (such as a toxic drug 
with a side effect)” will trigger a securities class action alleging that “investors were injured by the 
defendant company’s failure to disclose its misconduct or negligence”); ELISA MENDOZA & JEFFREY 
LUBITZ, ISS SEC. CLASS ACTION SERVS., EVENT-DRIVEN SECURITIES LITIGATION: THE NEW DRIVER 
IN CLASS ACTION GROWTH (2020), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/publications/ISS-SCAS-Event 
-Driven-Securities-Litigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GUN-43XY] (documenting the rise in event-driven 
securities class actions and discussing examples of recent cases); U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL 
REFORM, A RISING THREAT: THE NEW CLASS ACTION RACKET THAT HARMS INVESTORS AND THE 
ECONOMY 12 (2018), https://instituteforlegalreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/A_Rising_Threa 
t_Research_Paper-web_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8R6-TNEN] [hereinafter RISING THREAT] (explaining 
that event-driven securities class actions “typically contend that the defendant company’s statements 
before the adverse event occurred misrepresented the risk that an oil platform would explode, that its 
products would be the subject of tort litigation, or that its systems containing employee or customer 
information would be hacked” or, alternatively, “that the company was obligated to disclose the risk of 
the adverse event and failed to do so”); U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, CONTAINING THE 
CONTAGION: PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE BROKEN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SYSTEM (2019), https://i 
nstituteforlegalreform.com/research/containing-the-contagion-proposals-to-reform-the-broken-securiti 
es-class-action-system/ [https://perma.cc/9KMG-8MN7] (arguing that the number of event-driven 
securities class actions continues to rise and offering regulatory and legislative solutions that the SEC 
and Congress could adopt to address the perceived problem). 












mandated ESG disclosure would only accelerate this trend. Event-driven 
securities class actions can be difficult to get dismissed on the pleadings, 
even when of dubious merit.136 Although it may be highly doubtful that the 
alleged omissions were material to investors or that the defendant 
corporation acted with the requisite scienter, courts may (and often do) 
allow cases like this to proceed past a motion to dismiss.137 Unless the 
statement alleged to be misleading was so vague as to be considered puffery, 
questions of materiality are often treated by courts as raising factual 
questions inappropriate for resolution on a motion to dismiss. And whereas 
the PLSRA’s heightened scienter pleading requirement creates a real barrier 
to frivolous claims alleging that defendants knew, or were reckless in not 
knowing, the falsity of an affirmative misstatement, scienter may not be 
rigorously examined in half-truth cases. This is because scienter will turn 
on whether the defendants knew, or were reckless in not knowing, that a 
reasonable investor would have viewed the challenged statement as 
misleading in light of the omission of some allegedly material fact. Whether 
a statement is misleading, and whether an omitted fact is material, turns on 
the perspective of a “reasonable investor,” raising factual questions that 
courts may be reluctant to examine on a motion to dismiss.138  
 
136. See MENDOZA & LUBITZ, supra note 135, at 5 (the arguments made in event-driven litigation, 
“even if tenuous, do survive motions to dismiss”); JEFFREY A. DAILEY & NEAL ROSS MARDER, WILLIS 
TOWERS WATSON, THE RISE IN EVENT-DRIVEN SECURITIES LITIGATION: WHY IT MATTERS TO 
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 2 (2018), https://www.akingump.com/a/web/99361/aokuj/the-rise-in-event-
driven-securities-litigation-why-it-matters-to.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GAP-D4G9] (explaining that 
despite their weakness, “not all [event-driven] cases are dismissed, and even those that are dismissed 
come with significant cost and disruption to a company”); Emily Strauss, Is Everything Securities 
Fraud?, UNIV. IRVINE L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 15–16), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers 
.cfm?abstract_id=3664132 [https://perma.cc/9ZFX-8G6E] (reporting regression results of empirical 
study indicating that securities class actions arising from misconduct where the most direct victims are 
not shareholders have significantly lower dismissal rates than cases where the primary victims are 
shareholders). 
137. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Changing Character of Securities Litigation in 2019: Why It’s 
Time to Draw Some Distinctions, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 22, 2019), https://clsbluesky.la 
w.columbia.edu/2019/01/22/the-changing-character-of-securities-litigation-in-2019-why-its-time-to-dr 
aw-some-distinctions/ [https://perma.cc/7PA5-QB66] (explaining that “[w]hen the risk seemed remote 
at the time the corporate issuer made its disclosures, both the materiality of the issuer’s omission and its 
alleged scienter would seem open to serious challenge,” but that although “many cases should and will 
be dismissed, this category of cases may remain viable”); Strauss, supra note 136; see also id. at 22 
(“Many of the catastrophes that result in [event-driven] lawsuits may truly be black swan events, such 
that the risk that they might occur was so slight as to be immaterial, and thus disclosure of the risk was 
not required under the securities laws. Alternatively, even if the risk ultimately was material, managers 
may not have perceived it to be so, and therefore did not disclose the risk not because they thought they 
had anything to hide, but because they honestly and un-recklessly misjudged the likelihood that the 
disaster would occur. Under 10b-5, this constitutes mistake, rather than fraud, because the managers 
lacked scienter. In both of these situations, the fact of the underlying disaster opens the door to hindsight 
bias, potentially increasing pressure on defendants to settle.”). 













It can also be difficult to defeat class certification in event-driven 
litigation. To overcome individualized issues of reliance that would 
otherwise preclude class certification, plaintiffs in Rule 10b-5 class actions 
typically invoke the so-called “fraud-on-the-market” (FOTM) presumption 
of reliance first recognized by the Supreme Court in Basic v. Levinson.139 
The FOTM presumption proceeds from the notion that investors who did 
not actually read corporate disclosures nevertheless indirectly relied on 
them if the misrepresentation impacted the price that they paid for their 
securities. To invoke the presumption a plaintiff must prove that: the alleged 
misrepresentations were publicly known; the stock traded in an efficient 
market; and the plaintiff traded the stock between when the 
misrepresentations were made and when the truth was revealed.140 Plaintiffs 
must also plead—but need not prove until trial—that the misrepresentations 
were material.141 As the Supreme Court has explained: 
Each of these requirements follows from the fraud-on-the-market 
theory underlying the presumption. If the misrepresentation was not 
publicly known, then it could not have distorted the stock’s market 
price. So too if the misrepresentation was immaterial—that is, if it 
would not have “been viewed by the reasonable investor as having 
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available”—
or if the market in which the stock traded was inefficient. And if the 
plaintiff did not buy or sell the stock after the misrepresentation was 
made but before the truth was revealed, then he could not be said to 
have acted in reliance on a fraud-tainted price.142 
The Supreme Court has held that even though defendants cannot rebut the 
presumption at class certification by arguing that the misstatement was 
immaterial (an issue that must await resolution until summary judgment or 
trial), defendants are entitled to present evidence of a lack of “price impact” 
to do so—viz., evidence that the asserted misrepresentation (or its 
correction) did not in fact affect the market price of the defendant’s stock.143  
In traditional securities fraud cases alleging, for example, misrepresented 
financial results, defendants attempt to rebut price impact by presenting an 
event study showing either the lack of a statistically significant abnormal 
stock price increase at the time the challenged statement was made or the 
 
139. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). The Supreme Court recently was asked to 
overturn its holding in Basic but declined. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 
258 (2014). 
140. Halliburton, 573 U.S. at 277–78. 
141. Id. at 278. 
142. Id. at 278 (quoting Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 231–32). 
143. Id. at 283. 












lack of a statistically significant abnormal stock price decline on the date 
that the falsity of the alleged misstatement was revealed (the so-called 
“corrective date”). In event-driven litigation, however, both routes are 
typically unavailing. As to the former, plaintiff’s theory is not that the 
misleading statement inflated the stock price at the time it was made, but 
that it operated to maintain the company’s already inflated stock price. As 
to the latter, the “corrective date” will be the date on which a negative event 
occurred triggering a meaningful stock price decline—while all or most of 
that drop will reflect a “materialization of the risk and not the amount by 
which the price was previously inflated because the market was fooled into 
believing the risk was lower than it really was,” that is not something that 
an event study can easily establish.144  
An alternative potential way to establish a lack of price impact would be 
to argue that the statements at issue were too generic to have had any impact 
on the stock price. The Second Circuit recently held, however, that this is 
impermissible, reasoning that allowing this type of evidence would 
effectively permit a defendant to smuggle in evidence on materiality at class 
certification that should await consideration until summary judgment or 
trial. 145  The Supreme Court has agreed to review the Second Circuit’s 
decision; in its cert petition the defendant argued that review was warranted 
in part because under the Second Circuit’s reasoning “[t]he ease with which 
inflation-maintenance plaintiffs will be able to obtain class certification will 
further incentivize the troubling practice of ‘event-driven securities 
litigation.’”146 
The difficulties associated with terminating event-driven securities 
litigation at the motion to dismiss or class certification stage, coupled with 
the costs of discovery and extremely large potential damage awards typical 
in this sort of litigation,147 means that the risk of vexatious litigation is 
 
144. Merritt B. Fox & Joshua Mitts, Calamity: The Hazards of Event-Driven Securities Litigation 
4 (August 28, 2020) (manuscript on file with author); see also RISING THREAT, supra note 135, at 14 
(explaining that the “‘event’ invariably causes a very large drop in the company’s stock price,” and that 
while “all or most of that drop will be attributable to the adverse event itself, and the consequences for 
the company’s future profitability,” the “securities class action complaint will assert that the price drop 
resulted from the supposed ‘correction’ of prior false statements or material omissions” and “that the 
potential damages in the securities case are tied to that very large price drop, which the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
will use to argue for a large settlement, if the case proceeds past the motion to dismiss”). 
145. Ark. Tchr. Ret. Sys. v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 955 F.3d 254, 268 (2d. Cir. 2020), cert. 
granted sub nom., Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. v. Ark. Tchr. Ret. Sys., 2020 WL 7296815 (U.S. Dec. 11, 
2020) (No. 20-222). 
146. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. v. Ark. Tchr. Ret. Sys., 2020 WL 
5040492, at *26 (No. 20-222). 
147. Donald C. Langevoort, Disasters and Disclosures: Securities Fraud Liability in the Shadow 














high. 148  This has led many to voice concerns about event-driven 
litigation.149 These critics include not just groups like the U.S. Chamber 
Institute for Legal Reform that have a vested interest in reducing corporate 
liability exposure,150 but also respected scholars151 and even shareholder-
oriented groups like Institutional Shareholder Services. 152  Any serious 
 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers to maximize the size of the class—and the resulting recovery—by identifying as 
many false or misleading statements tied to the disaster, as far back in time as possible”). 
148. Strauss, supra note 136, at 18 (arguing that “[t]he pressure to settle even claims with a low 
probability of success is compounded in event-driven cases for several reasons,” including that: (1) “such 
firms are typically fighting battles on multiple fronts” and “might not have the resources to devote to 
battling out a shareholder lawsuit of even unclear merit, particularly when doing so will likely keep the 
initial misconduct in the news cycle and the stock price depressed”; and (2) “the application of 10b-5 
jurisprudence in event-driven securities cases has been inconsistent, leading to great uncertainty for 
defendants”). Proponents of mandatory ESG-disclosure have downplayed the associated private liability 
risk by pointing out that plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that they suffered a loss as a result of a 
misleading half-truth, see, e.g., Fisch, supra note 98, at 965, but plaintiffs’ burden to prove loss causation 
does little to mitigate the risk of vexatious litigation. Loss causation is an issue that generally cannot be 
resolved prior to the completion of discovery: it can be averred generally in the complaint, and the 
Supreme Court has held that defendants cannot present evidence of a lack of loss causation in opposition 
to class certification. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804 (2011). 
149. See, e.g., Kevin LaCroix, Scrutinizing Event-Driven Securities Litigation, D&O DIARY (Mar. 
27, 2018), https://www.dandodiary.com/2018/03/articles/securities-litigation/scrutinizing-event-driven-
securities-litigation/ [https://perma.cc/XQM8-TLU3] (“I have been sounding the alarm on event-driven 
cases for some time now. While on the one hand, these cases often lack merit (for example, they are 
often fatally deficient on scienter or causation allegations), on the other hand, their sheer volume means 
cost and vexation for companies and their insurers. The fact is that in the ebb and flow off [sic] day to 
day business, many companies face setbacks or hit unexpected operational hurdles. It is bad enough that 
these companies must deal with the adverse circumstances; increasingly they must also deal with a 
resulting securities lawsuit as well.”); JEFFREY A. DAILEY & NEAL ROSS MARDER, supra note 136, at 1 
(“The inherent problem in all event-driven securities litigation is that just because something bad 
happened does not mean that the company or its directors and officers committed fraud. Because many 
of these events relate to business or operational risks that are known or already subject to a company’s 
risk disclosures, many of the event-driven suits are based on the tenuous theory that the occurrence or 
the event upon which the case is based was the materialization of an under-disclosed or downplayed 
risk.”). 
150. RISING THREAT, supra note 135, at 2 (arguing that these cases “are powerful weapons for 
extorting settlements, regardless of the merits, due to the cost of defending the case in court and the 
reputational harm to the defendant company were the underlying event to appear in the headlines”); cf. 
Julie G. Reiser & Steven J. Toll, Event-Driven Litigation Defense, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (May 23, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/05/23/event-driven-litigation-def 
ense/ [https://perma.cc/4U9B-L8ND] (reacting to the Chamber’s position and arguing that “event-driven 
cases serve as a deterrent to companies who might otherwise conceal or misrepresent their operations 
because they recognize that investors will hold them accountable for doing so”). 
151. Coffee, Jr., supra note 135 (observing that the “trend in ‘event-driven’ litigation appears to 
be to file early, soon after the stock drop, and without the more elaborate investigation that the larger 
established plaintiff’s firms today employ in securities litigation [focused on more traditional financial 
frauds]”); Fox & Mitts, supra note 144, at 2 (“[T]oo many event-driven suits have survived past the 
motion to dismiss stage when the allegations in their complaints should have been found insufficient 
with respect to either loss causation or materiality.”). 
152. MENDOZA & LUBITZ, supra note 135, at 2 (“[T]he new trend of event-driven securities class 
action litigation is on the rise and resulting in more and more recoveries for shareholders, despite more 
tenuous arguments being the basis of the lawsuits.”); id. at 4 (observing that “[e]vent-driven suits are 
based on a more tenuous argument than core accounting” cases). 












discussion regarding the adoption of a broad SEC-mandated ESG disclosure 
regime cannot ignore these concerns. 
It should also be recognized that investors have alternative tools at their 
disposal to achieve greater consistency and credibility in corporate ESG 
disclosures, raising the question of why a mandatory regulatory solution 
should be favored over a market-based solution. Investors can submit 
precatory proposals under Rule 14a-8 requesting greater board involvement 
in ESG disclosure practices or ESG risk oversight, for example. 153  If 
investors can reach a consensus on which ESG disclosure framework they 
prefer, they can also use Rule 14a-8 or informal engagement to promote its 
use. They could use similar techniques to encourage integrated ESG 
reporting in SEC filings, if they view that as independently important. 
It appears that these techniques are already bearing considerable fruit. 
During the 2019 proxy season, Glass Lewis found that “approximately 43% 
of Russell 1000 companies had established some sort of board oversight of 
ESG issues.”154 Moreover, in Larry Fink’s 2020 letter to CEOs he asked the 
companies Blackrock invests in to: (1) publish a disclosure in line with 
industry-specific SASB guidelines by year-end, or disclose a similar set of 
data in a way that is relevant to the particular business; and (2) disclose 
climate-related risks in line with the recommendations of the Task Force on 
Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD). 155  Other leading asset 
managers, such as State Street and Vanguard, have similarly called on 
 
153. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8. SEC Rule 14a-8 permits shareholders of publicly held companies to 
require management to include shareholder-sponsored proposals in management’s proxy statement if 
certain procedural requirements are met and the substance of the proposal does not fall within one of 
several enumerated bases for exclusion. See Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law Is Dead”: Heroic 
Managerialism, Legal Change, and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of the American 
Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 305, 340 (2013) (“SEC Rule 14a-8 . . . was first adopted in 1942, in what 
could be seen as a late burst of New Deal enthusiasm for grassroots (shareholder) democracy; the 
requirement is still sometimes referred to as the ‘Town Hall rule.’”). In recent years, “shareholders have 
enjoyed considerable success under the [] rule in requiring management to include shareholder proposals 
relating to social issues.” Thomas Lee Hazen, Corporate and Securities Law Impact on Social 
Responsibility and Corporate Purpose, 62 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 37), https://p 
apers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3542833 [https://perma.cc/XF9R-CC6T]; see also id. at 37 
nn.220–22 (citing examples of instances where the SEC staff has refused to allow management to 
exclude shareholder proposals “relating to sustainability, climate change, and ESG”); cf. Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Revitalizing SEC Rule 14a-8’s Ordinary Business Exclusion: Preventing Shareholder 
Micromanagement by Proposal, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 705 (2016) (critiquing this trend). While the SEC 
recently tightened the ownership requirements for submitting shareholder proposals and heightened the 
level of shareholder support a proposal must receive to be eligible for resubmission, it did not broaden 
the substantive bases upon which management can exclude shareholder proposals. See Press Release, 
SEC, SEC Adopts Amendments to Modernize Shareholder Proposal Rule (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www. 
sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-220 [https://perma.cc/S5YR-8U97]. 
154. Proxy Talk: How Corporate Boards Can Oversee ESG Issues, GLASS LEWIS (Apr. 29, 2020), 
https://www.glasslewis.com/proxy-talk-how-corporate-boards-can-oversee-esg-issues/ [https://perma.c 
c/W7WF-BG9M]. 













companies to align their ESG disclosures with the SASB standards and 
TCFD recommendations.156  Moreover, calls for greater consistency and 
comparability in ESG disclosures have led major standard setters to begin 
efforts at harmonization.157 While the proposals seeking an SEC-mandated 
ESG disclosure framework have emphasized the failure of market forces 
over the past several decades to produce “consistent, comparable, highly-
reliable ESG information,” they may have spoken too soon.158 
A final point is in order. The concerns raised thus far are likely to 
resonate most strongly with those who possess a free-market orientation. 
But progressive scholars have also warned against the tendency to try to 
 
156. See, e.g., RON O’HANLEY, STATE ST., THE ESG OPPORTUNITY FOR CORPORATE DIRECTORS: 
FIVE QUESTIONS FOR ESG BOARD OVERSIGHT 8 (2021), https://www.statestreet.com/content/dam/state 
street/documents/Articles/ron-ohanley-esg-opportunity-for-corporate-directors.pdf [https://perma.cc/V 
T78-7CXZ] (“State Street, like other large investors, has endorsed SASB and TFCD as two market-
driven frameworks that ask companies to provide decision-useful information in a consistent way”). 
Companies appear to be listening. See Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2021 Letter to CEOs, BLACKROCK 
(2021), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/ 
KZ63-CBDK] (“We are greatly encouraged by the progress we have seen over the past year – a 363% 
increase in SASB disclosures and more than 1,700 organizations expressing support for the TCFD.”). 
While the influence of asset managers weakens the case for SEC-mandated ESG disclosure, it raises 
controversies of its own. See supra note 12; see also Saura Masconale & Simone M. Sepe, Corporate 
Conformism (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., L. Working Paper No. 568, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/so 
l3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3793035 (arguing that investor-induced corporate conformism on contested 
moral issues undermines pluralistic values). An examination of these controversies falls outside the 
scope of this Article. 
157. See SASB & Other ESG Frameworks: The Sustainability Reporting Ecosystem, 
SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., https://www.sasb.org/about/sasb-and-other-esg-frameworks/ 
[https://perma.cc/8TZ5-5K3X] (reporting that in “September 2020, five leading framework and 
standard-setting organizations—CDP, CDSB, GRI, IIRC and SASB—announced a shared vision for a 
comprehensive corporate reporting system that includes both financial accounting and sustainability 
disclosure, connected via integrated reporting,” and that in “response to global market demands for 
convergence, in November 2020 the IIRC and SASB announced their intention to merge into a unified 
organization, the Value Reporting Foundation”); see also Press Release, Int’l Integrated Reporting 
Council, IIRC and SASB Announce Intent to Merge in Major Step Towards Simplifying the Corporate 
Reporting System (Nov. 25, 2020), https://integratedreporting.org/news/iirc-and-sasb-announce-intent-
to-merge-in-major-step-towards-simplifying-the-corporate-reporting-system/ [https://perma.cc/4524-X 
3RB]; IMPACT MGMT. PROJECT, WORLD ECON. F. & DELOITTE, STATEMENT OF INTENT TO WORK 
TOGETHER TOWARDS COMPREHENSIVE CORPORATE REPORTING (2020), https://29kjwb3armds2g3gi4lq 
2sx1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/Statement-of-Intent-to-Work-Together-Towards-C 
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expand the scope of the federal securities laws in service of non-financial 
interests. In a recent article, Professor Ann Lipton warns of the “detrimental 
effects of relying on investor-oriented disclosure to serve the needs of the 
general public.”159 She argues that funneling demands for ESG disclosure 
through the SEC encourages advocates for information disclosure geared 
toward stakeholder audiences to conceal their true motives and that this 
prevarication comes at real cost, as the “need to emphasize financial risk 
and shareholder return inhibits a fuller discussion of the societal need for 
such information” and risks “contributing to a discourse that suggests that 
investors are the only members of society who matter.”160 She also points 
out that SEC-mandated ESG disclosure would fail to reach a growing 
number of large and socially impactful private companies, not subject to 
SEC-imposed disclosure obligations. 161  A better approach, in Lipton’s 
view, is to push for a generalized disclosure system designed for stakeholder 
as opposed to investor interests.162  
CONCLUSION 
Henry Kissinger is credited with coining the idea of “constructive 
ambiguity” as a negotiating tactic, one that employs the deliberate use of 
ambiguous language on sensitives topics to advance some political purpose. 
But ambiguity can be destructive as well, particularly if the end sought is 
sound public policy. Whether the SEC ought to mandate “ESG” disclosure, 
and if so, how, can be approached and debated on a discrete, topic by topic 
basis, like any other item of arguably material information. If the call instead 
is for the SEC to adopt a broad ESG disclosure framework modeled on 
frameworks designed to meet the informational needs of stakeholder-
inclusive audiences, then the significance of the request should be 
recognized and the difficult questions it raises openly addressed. 
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